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The Failure and Future of Democracy

已有 512 次阅读2018-7-19 12:40 |个人分类:Eu-Asia 欧-亚


The Failure — and Future — of Democracy In Europe


Vojko Volk is the Slovenian ambassador to Croatia. He has also served as Slovenia’s ambassador to Italy and the head of Slovenia’s Liasion Office to UNMIK. He is the author of From the Nation to the State and Back (2012) and has published widely throughout Europe. He is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.
https://fpif.org/the-failure-and-future-of-democracy-in-europe/

european-union-EU-democracy-greek-bailout-austerity-referendum

European Parliament (Photo: Wikipedia)

There’s at least one reason we should be grateful to the Greek people for exposing the European Union’s democratic dysfunction this summer: Their recent referendum showed that majority rule is impossible in a multinational union.

Creating the illusion of democratic decisions within the EU, even when there is no clear will among the member states, has returned like a boomerang with the recent Greek vote — the Greek people voted overwhelmingly against more austerity, but their European neighbors forced it on them anyway. This is especially relevant for a group of states with a single currency, a single financial pillar that supports not only a vast economic-monetary-regulatory platform, but the destiny of multiple countries and millions of human lives.

Thomas Jefferson was right when he claimed that “banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties then standing armies.” With the Greek government’s reluctant decision to accept a proposed bailout plan in which nobody believes, Greeks are heading toward death by installment.

The Greek lesson is not new. A number of multinational states have fallen apart due to irreconcilable differences — between national sovereignty and the democratic principle of majority rule — that have enabled big nations to impose their will on the small ones. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and even Czechoslovakia fell apart after democratic elections simply because every nation wants to decide its own destiny. Therefore democracy is beautiful and efficient as long as it acts within national boundaries. But in a union of states like the EU, the issue of decision-making among nations presents a big problem.

To this end I wrote a seemingly bold statement in the first part of an article last year, claiming that “the will of the people” would be the reef past which the EU would be unable to sail without serious reforms and changes. Absent those changes, the EU risked foundering on the reef and breaking up.

The Greek referendum has confirmed exactly this. They are a nation and can autonomously decide their destiny, even at their own expense. The problem is that their decision will not be without consequences for other nations — which are also in the EU, use the Euro, and retain the right to take a different position. If Greece’s destiny were decided by a referendum of the whole of the EU — according to the principle one EU citizen, one vote — everything would be different. The largest nations or interest alliances would have the majority in such power brawls.

This political inevitability may have inspired the great playwright Henrik Ibsen to quip: “The majority is always wrong; the minority is rarely right.”

In short, the future of Europe is caught in a very simple paradox. This paradox has been swept under the rug for decades, camouflaged by bureaucratic regulations concerning energy-saving light bulbs and the length and shape of vegetables. Nobody has seriously dealt with the unsustainability of decision-making within the EU since a fairly decent attempt in the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe in 2004.

At this level of its development, the EU is obviously not able to face these facts. But the facts won’t go away. Winston Churchill’s simple wisdom has been haunting the EU ever since the statesman’s speech at the University of Zürich in 1946: “The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important,” he predicted. “Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honor by a contribution to the common cause.”

As we can see, we’re not much closer to this ideal now than we were in Churchill’s times.

In this fashion we can understand the frustrations of the European bureaucracy. In its inability to seek truly important political solutions for the progress of the EU, it has produced loads of unnecessarily precise directives for almost everything, from cattle farming to waste disposal and the shapes of yogurt cups. Yet when a single member state decides to refuse the EU’s proposal, the mighty Union is shaken to its foundation.

The biggest problem here isn’t not knowing how to proceed; far worse, it’s not knowing how to go back.

The Greek decision is — like it or not — only a decision by an EU member state. It’s entirely legitimate, entirely legal, and entirely within the framework of basic principles on which the EU functions and was founded on. The same goes for the French and the Dutch referendums in 2005 that, by a convincing majority, rejected the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe and most likely averted the first step on the path to Churchill’s vision of a United States of Europe.

Ironically, French President Francois Hollande is the first to admit that the EU needs to be reformed — exactly as it was proposed 10 years ago and rejected by the French in that 2005 referendum!

The EU is a structure in which a gigantic monetary building stands on a political pillar that is a mere toothpick. Hollande is now proposing to strengthen the toothpick by turning the current consensus decision-making into a government and a parliament of the 18 countries using the euro. But again, this kind of structure has so far not worked in a multinational exercise so far. To make a United States of Europe without Europeans is no more sensible than making America without Americans.

When Cicero was campaigning for senator in the year 64 B.C., his immensely cunning brother Quintus, a precursor of the great Machiavelli, advised him how to win in that decisive year for Rome and ascend to the levels of power: “Promise them anything, look them in the eyes and lie, spread joy and optimism. After the elections you will keep some of the promises, especially the ones which suit you.”

The similarity of the current Greek story with this antique wisdom is by no mean accidental. Its moral is far above the banality of the common saying that “those who don’t work, should not eat.” Ultimately we are united on this European ship more than we might think, and definitely more than we’re aware of.

If democracy is failing, why do so many lay claim to it?

February 6, 2018 8.25pm EST

The 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong against ‘Chinese-style democracy’ laid bare democracy’s contested meanings. Studio Incendo/flickrCC BY-SA

Authors

https://theconversation.com/if-democracy-is-failing-why-do-so-many-lay-claim-to-it-88483

These comments on the global fate of democracy, the last in the Is Democracy Dead or Alive? series, are gathered by Democratic Theoryand co-published by The Conversation with the Sydney Democracy Network. Several of these comments will feature as full-length articles in a special issue of Democratic Theory.


A higher ideal, despite failures along the way

Patricia Roberts-Miller, University of Texas-Austin

Democracy is always being pronounced dead by those who are trying to kill it. Perhaps because it has tended toward ambitious claims of its origins and possibilities, democracy is held to higher and often different standards from other models of governance.

Democracy certainly has its instances of disastrous decisions – from supporting the Sicilian Expedition to our current problem of citizens wanting lower taxes and more expensive services.

In this regard, however, it’s no different from any other form of government: oligarchy, monarchy, fascism and rule by the market all have their disastrous wars, unwise economic policies, and even outright genocides.

Many critics argue that democracy is an inherently flawed system because “the citizenry” is not actually very good at making decisions. And, granted, the empirical research does show that voters tend to make decisions largely on the basis of identificationshort-term gainpoliticians’ charisma, and factionalism.

Voters are prone to such cognitive biases as false binaries, the availability heuristicin-group favouritism, confirmation biasjust world hypothesisnaïve realism, and others. In other words, citizens are only human.

And that is ultimately the point. Humans are prone to cognitive biases. There is no governmental system immune to bad decisions, no set of experts with the judgement of angels, because human government is necessarily one run by humans.

Democracies rarely live up to the ideals of democracy, and so democracy remains an aspiration, but it is a normative one, in which our inevitable failure inspires us to try better.

Basic values survive disappointment

Xavier Marquez, Victoria University of Wellington

News of democracy’s demise has been greatly exaggerated. Academic measures show at worst small declines in the level of democracy in the world in the last decade.

The constitutional documents of almost every country proclaim their democratic character, and few governments wish to be thought undemocratic. Peoples throughout the world demand democracy, and pro-democracy feeling is high even in the most unlikely places.

With some very minor exceptions, as historian John Dunn has noted, the word “democracy” has come to symbolise the only legitimate political system in most languages.

Yet, despite its apparent triumph, democracy’s meaning remains disputed and disappointments with its reality are keenly felt.

The standard view of liberal democracy, with its emphasis on electoral institutions, checks and balances and individual rights, has been challenged both by illiberal populists, claiming to speak more clearly on behalf of “The People”, and by conceptions of technocratic management reinvigorated by the apparent successes of a Chinese model that still officially wishes to be called “the people’s democratic dictatorship”.

Under Xi Jinping, China now has a day to celebrate a constitution that sets down the principle of ‘the people’s democratic dictatorship’.HKmPUA/flickrCC BY-NC-SA

The contemporary high esteem for the vague idea of democracy and surprisingly low esteem for actually existing democracies suggests the source of the problem. Since the basic values of democracy – equality, freedom and consent, among others – have often been in conflict with existing hierarchies of power, prestige and knowledge, it is no wonder that existing democracies so often produce disappointment.

Nevertheless, democracy’s values are also alluring; it is telling that today few who wish to condemn the failures of democracy do so in the name of anything other than democracy.

Governing ourselves is hard work

Sor-hoon Tan, National University of Singapore

Democracy has never been the “only game in town”, just better than others in terms of offering ordinary citizens more chance or hope of having some say in the decisions that affect them.

No country has ever lived up to the ideal of the people truly governing themselves. Attempts to realise this ideal could only be measured by different degrees to which ordinary citizens have influenced political outcomes and achieved self-government in their daily lives.

It is not democracy, but rather the imperfect mechanisms for achieving it that are failing in the face of today’s challenges. Instead of jettisoning one ideology (which is unfortunately what democracy has come to mean for many) for other more dangerous alternatives, it is up to every one of us to realise that, for self-preservation, we must try even harder to find some way to prevent others from dictating how the world and our lives will turn out.

We need more, not less, democracy. But democracy cannot be forced on another, nor can it be handed over as a free gift. Unless people want and are willing to put in the effort to govern themselves, democracy has no hope.

At risk of losing its meaning

James Wong, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Recently, Rana Mitter wrote:

China is now in position to redefine democracy for the region, taking ownership and reshaping the term in its own, more authoritarian image.

If Mitter is correct, the real issue seems to be not so much about the dying of democracy but whether the world will accept China’s redefinition of democracy with fewer liberal elements.

China is sceptical of liberal democracy as it cannot guarantee political stability and harmony. Adam Przeworski’s famous definition of democracy as institutionalised uncertainty is what China seeks to avoid.

At the core of so-called “Chinese-style democracy”, such an institutionalised possibility of unforeseen outcomes is not embraced. People, or at least leaders, want to know not only what is possible, but also what will happen. This explains why China is keen on restricting domains for certain assurance of outcomes – from the list of candidates screened for elections to the varieties of opinions censored in everyday life.

Does this redefinition make democracy a sham? To a large extent, yes. How popular is it going to be? It’s hard to say. But if people are so frustrated by the outrageous outcomes of democratic uncertainty, some may be tempted by the seemingly more assured alternatives.

What we need to recognise is that these alternatives come in the name of democracy and not authoritarianism.

In the future, we might not witness the death of democracy but rather the discursive struggles over its different definitions and redefinitions, over its mutation into something different.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping both espouse their own versions of democracy. President of Russia

Where do democrats find common ground?

Camille Bedock, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Talking about the “crisis of democracy” is consubstantial with democracy itself. Representative democracy in particular, as Bernard Manin argues, is built on elections that are simultaneously aristocratic and democratic, egalitarian and inegalitarian.

As such, pessimism about representative democracy has always existed. What is new is the renewed intellectual and political controversy about what democracy is and what it should achieve. This is creating a sense of emergency to “reform” democracy.

Around the second world war, the dominant Western definition of democracy, embodied for instance by Josef Schumpeter, was fairly monolithic: democracy revolved around elections, which are organised to choose between political parties alternating in power, with relatively uninformed and deferent citizens.

Today the picture is blurrier: traditionally dominant parties in so-called consolidated democracies are paddling in troubled waters. Some are at risk of disappearing altogether.

Elections are less and less seen as the cornerstone of democracy. Instead we are seeing the multiplication of groups challenging representation and proposing mechanisms that attempt to go beyond elections.

Citizens also no longer share a unified, uncritical and enthusiastic vision of democracy. A substantial share of themactually show little commitment to the democratic regimen.

Concurrently, multiple and often contradictory versions of democracy have come to the forefront in public and intellectual debates: participatory democracy, stealth democracy, advocacy democracy, direct democracy, output-oriented democracy, deliberative democracy, and so on.

A huge question remains unanswered: can traditional “representative” democracy be combined with new forms of democracy without creating more ambiguity about what democracy actually is?

Crisis is also an opportunity to revitalise

Sabeel Rahman, Brooklyn Law School

Democracy in the US is in the midst of a crisis, but perhaps not in the way that many might think. Our current democratic crisis is both worse and better than it may seem.

The crisis of American democracy is not so much one of a blatant collapse into open authoritarianism; rather, the crisis arises from a deeper, in some ways more systemic, failure.

Democracy as a moral ideal involves two dimensions: the negative value of anti-domination – resisting the concentration of arbitrary power, in individual private or public actors, or in diffuse systems like the market itself – and the positive value of agency – expanding our collective capacities for self-government. Along both of these dimensions, modern democracy is in crisis.

Our democracies have failed to protect their communities from the problem of domination, whether in the form of concentrated private power from too-big-to-fail finance or new corporate titans, or in the form of the diffused inequities of contemporary capitalism and subordination of different communities.

At the same time, however, crises are moments of reinvention. The economic and political upheavals of the current moment offer a very real opportunity to reinvent and renew democracy’s promise.

It is out of such moments of crisis that radically democratising movements and institutional transformations in US history have taken place: Radical Reconstruction following the Civil War; the New Deal following the Great Depression; the civil rights movement following Jim Crow.

Such revitalisation is not a foregone conclusion. But a wide range of social movements are leading the charge for a more inclusive, equitable, multiracial democratic order. Whether we can achieve this remains to be seen.

There are many ways for democracy to fail

Columnist

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/there-are-many-ways-for-democracy-to-fail/2018/04/20/a8355cd2-43ed-11e8-bba2-0976a82b05a2_story.html?utm_term=.d83ed44fbe40

“I hope that one day we’d be able to return to a country we recognize.” For the first time since she was murdered by a car bomb six months ago, members of Daphne Caruana Galizia’s family have spoken publicly about the circumstances that led to her death. Caruana Galizia was a Maltese journalist who wrote about corruption and money laundering in a country that had turned a blind eye to it. As one of her sons says in a video recorded by an international consortium set up to continue her investigations, she was “fighting to hold Malta and Maltese society to a higher standard.”

She was also reporting on a country that has undergone tumultuous change. Once a rocky, sleepy Mediterranean backwater — Malta was a British colony until 1964 — the island has transformed itself over the past decade into a tax haven, a hub for online gambling and, as Caruana Galizia alleged, a hub for international money laundering. In the past few years, the island has profited immensely from the sale of Maltese passports. Criminals as well as legitimate businessmen from around the world essentially park their planes at the Valletta airport and then exchange suitcases full of cash for the right to live, and to keep their money, inside the European Union. Many Maltese benefited from the rising property prices, but Caruana Galizia suspected that some of that money went directly to Maltese politicians and bureaucrats.

In light of the major speech French President Emmanuel Macron made to the European Parliament this last week calling on fellow Europeans to “take the firm choice to defend democracy,” it is worth looking at why Malta changed so dramatically. Most analyses of Macron’s speech assumed he was talking about Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland, countries whose current ruling parties havepoliticized the judiciary, turned public media into party propaganda organs, and made life difficult or impossible for independent media. But in an era when international flows of money dwarf the state budgets of many countries, Macron’s warning about the weakness of Western democracy should be read much more widely.

In Malta, the independent institutions that should, in theory, enforce a neutral or impartial version of the law are, in practice, far too weak to do so. Paul Caruana Galizia, one of Daphne’s sons, argues that in Malta, the prime minister in practice controls the police force, judicial appointments and the attorney general. As a result, few of his mother’s stories, even those connecting the prime minister and his entourage tosecret offshore accounts, ever led to official investigations, let alone prosecutions: “No attorney general has ever brought a case against the government,” he told me.

This weakness has infected his mother’s murder case: Although three men have been arrested for planting the car bomb, authorities have not found out who was behind it, nor seriously questioned many of the people who might have had a motive to do it.

But is this failure to enforce the rule of law really so unusual? Just thislast week, it was reported why tax authorities in Britain, a country which is meant to have more robust institutions than Malta, refused to investigate Lycamobile, a British telecoms company, even after French prosecutors arrested 19 people accused of using its accounts to launder money. Although the allegations against Lycamobile include details just as sordid as those in a typical Caruana Galizia story — couriers dropping bags of cash at post offices across London, vast fake billing schemes and fake companies — BuzzFeed News has now published excerpts from a government letter explaining why British tax authorities hesitated. Officials argued both that the company is just too big — it is “a large multinational company” with “vast assets at their disposal” — and too powerful: Lycamobile is “the biggest corporate donor to the Conservative party led by Prime Minister Theresa May and donated 1.25 [million] Euros to the Prince Charles Trust in 2012.”

If tax authorities, fraud police, judges and prosecutors are too understaffed and too cowed to enforce the law in Britain — a country that prides itself on its ancient democratic traditions, including rule of law — then how well are they doing elsewhere? This isn’t just a European problem. Even apart from his role linking the Trump campaign to Russia, it is striking how many glaring irregularities special counsel Robert S. Mueller III found in the business affairs of Paul Manafort. Had he not reentered American politics and become the focus of heavy scrutiny, Manafort probably would have gotten away with his alleged fraud. Most money launderers do.

His story, like the story of Caruana Galizia, shows that there is more than one way for democracy to fail. The independent institutions that enforce the law, control criminality and prevent corrosive corruption can be weakened, openly and dramatically, from above, as they are in Hungary. But they can also be weakened from below. If independent legal institutions are deprived of resources and understaffed, if journalists who report on crimes are ignored, if the public is indifferent — these, too, are sure paths toward democratic failure. And such things can happen slowly, quietly, almost imperceptibly — at least until a crisis, or a bomb explosion, reveals that its citizens are living in a country they no longer recognize.

Read more from Anne Applebaum’s archivefollow her on Twitter orsubscribe to her updates on Facebook.

Is There a Future for Democracy?

The world is changing faster than ever, and it is unclear whether modern democracy will be able to keep up with the changes. To quote A.J.P. Taylor, ‘nothing is inevitable, until it happens’, and predicting democracy’s future is no exception. In a world where the IT revolution is having profound effects on the economy, society and politics, positive and negative, where inequality in the developed world is on the rise, but where millions in the developing world are rising out of poverty, where Islamic fundamentalism appears on the rise in the Islamic world, but where in other regions there is also an increase in a non-ideological, secular approach, and where over half the world’s population is urban, it is hard to say what opportunities democracy will have, what threats there are to it, and whether its response will be effective. Will the connection between freedom and equality hold, or will it be broken – or will their relationship change under the pressure of new circumstance? Will democracy as we know it – a hybrid of government by elected officials, a free market economy and the rule of law – nevertheless survive in recognizable form?

the-future-next-exit_slider

The Arab Spring

In some parts the prospects for democracy have never been brighter, but in others there have rarely been so many problems and doubts about its effectiveness, especially in dealing with inequality, economic distress, and global issues. The focus of democratic interest has recently been on the Arab Spring. The lessons for democracy are so far mixed, its prospects here ambivalent. On the one hand, the initial revolutions in North Africa benefited greatly from new communications technology, which made it almost impossible to stop information getting out and being shared, allowing for greater co-ordination by the revolutionaries. On the other hand, technology has done little to solve old problems of political organization and economic disorder. It has not enabled the initial revolutionaries, often young, quite secular professionals, to achieve political power, once more established, less progressive, elements in society came into play, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As in 1848, the idealistic optimism of the revolutions’ beginnings has had to face social and economic realities that militate against Western democratic values.

To some commentators, it must look as though the move to 1849, the year of reaction, has already repeated itself. The rule of a fairly pragmatic Islamist, President Morsi, in Egypt was not in itself cause for democratic despair, if he had followed the model, for instance, of the moderate Islamist government of Turkey. Instead, the army’s intervention in Egypt has been justified on the grounds that Morsi was pushing the Islamist agenda too far, in an anti-democratic manner. The fact that Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also seems to be overstepping the bounds of the status quo with Turkey’s secular establishment also suggests the problems in keeping the tension between Islamist politics and modern democracy under control. The catastrophe in Syria should concentrate minds on the need for practical and moderate policies, but history is littered with examples of people not learning the obvious lessons. One of them appears to be Morsi; Erdoğan might be another. Certainly, the post-revolutionary governments of the Arab Spring seem so far, with the possible exception of Tunisia, incapable of producing effective governance. The potential extension of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism’s influence in Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf and Palestine, through Hezbollah and Hamas, also should not be discounted as an anti-democratic factor. Having democracy’s supporters side with Saudi Arabia, an absolute theocratic monarchy, is frankly a peculiar outcome, but perhaps the most practical.

Prospects in South America and Africa

South America has been lately a success story for democracy. The right-wing dictatorships that so recently dominated the continent have gone. Chile, Brazil and Uruguay have confidently returned to the democratic community, and the recent Brazilian riots do not appear to change this trajectory. There are several countries, led by the late Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, which have promoted ‘Bolivarian’ democracy, putting the popular element in modern democracy ahead of its more liberal and market oriented aspects. Argentina has also pursued an independent course that veers from the modern democratic model, especially regarding financial rules. On the other hand, these countries maintain democratic forms and will probably come to resemble the other modern democracies on the continent. Then there is Cuba, a souvenir of the Cold War, still exerting a sentimental (anti-American) influence over many Central and South Americans. Yet it is likely that the Cuban regime will liberalize in the not-too-distant future and join most of the rest of the Caribbean and Central American states as functioning democracies; one hopes that includes Haiti at last. Mexico, once only formally a democratic republic, has made great advances in democratization and, despite its drug-cartel problems, is set to be a major player in pan-American politics. Assuming economic growth continues to be adequate, the prospects for democracy in Central and South America appear good.

Sub-Saharan Africa offers a better prospect for democratic progress than it has for some time, but it is still halting. Ghana, Benin, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia counted as ‘flawed democracies’ in the Democracy Index of 2011, and a more generous definition of modern democracy would include more states, such as Nigeria, Liberia, Tanzania and Senegal, perhaps Kenya, too, after the recent election there. Much of the continent is still struggling to achieve sustainable democratic norms along with general economic prosperity. For every Ghana, there is a Zimbabwe, or Democratic Republic of Congo – and even a state regarded as democratic in 2011, such as Mali, can quickly fall back to more discouraging forms of governance. Relatively prosperous countries such as South Africa are often the objects of Western investor scepticism, but South Africa continues to be democratic; Ghanaian success also suggests a democratic way forward. On the transnational level, the African Union has also proved quite active and responsible in its responses to the continent’s many crises. Post-colonial legacies are waning as an obstacle to co-operation and more free-market economic policies, so sub-Saharan Africa could become a more positive area for modern democracy.

Asia – the crux of democracy

The future of democracy will likely be decided in Asia. If India can continue to flourish as a democracy, this will be a vital support for the democratic cause. It might well spread its democratic influence further afield, to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and a newly receptive Burma, although nothing would be more helpful for India than peace with Pakistan, and for that country to solidify its democratic credentials and defuse the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Most south-east Asian states, even Malaysia, seem well on the way to being prosperous and influential democracies. Singapore has been so successful as to be a model for a sort of economically neoliberal authoritarianism, but it has shown democratizing tendencies of late and could without much difficulty join those other major democracies in the region: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand.

The big question is what will happen in China, with its 1.4 billion people. It is, formally, a ‘people’s republic’ but this still means a state ruled absolutely by a dirigiste oligarchy, the Communist Party. China’s recent economic success has prompted many Chinese and others to see it as a superior, more efficient model for generating economic growth and hence wellbeing – at the expense of personal freedom. The actual net effect of China’s prosperity could well be that the new middle classes will demand more power for civil society outside the party apparatus, much as happened in nineteenth-century central Europe. Or perhaps the politics already practised within the party will simply externalize itself and form a competitive political party system out of the body of the party itself – as party leaders appeal increasingly to the interests and approval of the public at large. China will, I think, soon enough, within a generation, become a form of modern democracy, and at that point an already fairly pragmatic leadership will be more persuadable as a partner in global multilateral governance.

Russia seems to be going the other way, back to older soviet or even tsarist forms. If the West resumes economic growth, however, Russian geopolitical power and the prestige of its neo-authoritarian style should diminish and the other side of Russia – the wish to be part of the free West – will reassert itself, akin to Ukraine’s effort to strengthen contacts with the EU. Once Russia liberalizes, its remaining allies in eastern Europe and Eurasia will perforce do so also. It is a matter of when – if the West resumes growth and stays on its democratic course.

European democracy in the balance

That is a bigger ‘if’ than it should be. The current economic doldrums in Europe have been unnecessarily exacerbated by bad policy decisions, such as the insistence, led by Germany but echoed by Britain and others, on austerity, and the unwelcome return of narrow-minded interpretations of national interests. The economic travails have produced, among other things, the current Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán. Democratically elected by a massive landslide in 2010, his Fidesz party has used its absolute control of Hungary’s political system to compromise many of the liberal-democratic features of the Hungarian state. A democratically elected party is pursuing deeply antidemocratic measures in the heart of Europe. The crisis caused by Jörg Haider in Austria in 2000 is child’s play compared to Orbán’s policies in Hungary. If the European Union’s other members cannot counter Orbán’s power grab, then many of the assumptions of Europe being a community of democracies will be upended. Meanwhile, Germany’s government appears to think that outrageous levels of unemployment in southern European countries, which also have anti-democratic traditions, are quite acceptable in pursuit of economic virtue. No wonder Europe has lost the optimistic energy it possessed during the enlargement of 2004.

The current German-led policy of austerity being followed to solve Europe’s fiscal and economic crisis has the potential to break the Union in the longer term, because of the resentments it inevitably causes. It is unwise for future European solidarity, and even antidemocratic in its doctrinaire refusal to compromise, insisting on the necessity of such massive economic pain. A better policy would be to realize that economics is not a zero-sum game, and that combining greater mutual dependence with more generous financial help from the European Central Bank and deficit spending would produce greater economic growth and more financial confidence (as the American recovery has shown). Keynesian economics is much better suited to democracy than the current rigid neoliberal policies, not only because it avoids unnecessary hardship in the populace, but it also allows for more positive government action. The German, and even more inexcusably the British, governments’ rejection of Keynesianism is tragic.

Threats to democracy

The economic crisis has also undermined Europe’s pluralist embrace of diversity. It has exacerbated the very nationalism and xenophobia that partly caused it (through inadequately co-ordinated transnational responses to the financial collapse). Right-wing media corporations, their billionaire owners and their political allies have, moreover, stoked and then exploited fear of immigrants, especially Islamophobia against the many Muslim immigrants now in such countries as France, Germany and the Netherlands. This in turn was partly a reaction to another major threat to democracy, the Islamist terrorism of al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadists, post-9/11. This growth in Islamophobia has also had a large impact in America. It might even be said that the threat of terrorism in the West is not as much of a potential long-term threat to democratic values as the Islamophobic paranoia that it has evoked as a response, especially in the rush to curtail civil liberties in favour of security and order.

There has been a justified counter-reaction to the curtailing of many individual rights when it comes to terrorism, and the expansion of the surveillance and control apparatus of the state. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp remains a dagger at the heart of civil liberties and the rule of law, and it is unnerving to think that the Internet is full of snoops. The ability of drones to ‘take out’ terrorist suspects from thousands of feet in the sky, controlled by someone thousands of miles away is also repugnant to our sense of fair play and personal freedom. Yet the libertarian paranoia created by the realization that one cannot evade the state any more is itself misguided. New technology has made the world smaller and increased the reach of the law and government, regardless of our ideological reluctance. There is no public space in Britain not under video surveillance; in the United States, the open frontier of the Wild West has effectively disappeared, as surveillance and communication technology has progressed and we are ever more dependent on the Internet – which, as the recent irresponsible revelations by Edward Snowden have shown (are we surprised?), is monitored, at varying degrees, by the intelligence services of our governments.

Physical freedom can no longer exist without democracy’s institutional defences of legal freedoms, and controls on government. It is often not even government that is the threat – it is private snooping, by the newspapers of News Corporation, for instance, that recently posed threats to privacy; the only defence against such intrusions is the state, even when they potentially come from the state itself. That, ironically, is the conclusion to be drawn from the Snowden affair – the surveillance that he revealed was not only hard to prevent in our current wired world; it was also justifiable, even, perhaps, necessary. The key point is that the government agencies are under a tight legal regimen, reinforced and expanded by the Obama administration, which has so far prevented – as far as we know – any major abuse by government agents and agencies. We have available legal and political measures by which we can control the new threats to our democratic liberties. As citizens of a democracy, we just need to be vigilant in demanding their enforcement, and make sure that the people we entrust with these powers understand and act on their responsibilities to that democracy.

Democracy and the new media

New technology is already having far-reaching effects on another vital aspect of democracy: freedom of speech and the free media. In many respects information technology and the Internet have enabled an explosion of free speech and have been instrumental in democratization. The liberating effect of citizens being able to participate in discussions and co-ordinate action not only on a national but also transnational and global level is incalculable. The Internet has been a boon for our ‘monitory democracy’, where NGOs and almost spontaneously formed pressure groups can keep a critical eye on power. Yet there is also a danger in this flood of information: the lack of gate-keepers means that we no longer have an institutional adjudication of what is true or just politicized slur. Before, ‘newspapersof- record’ or broadcast news could be relied on to tell us something close to objective truth. We could obtain well-founded opinion from the ‘op-ed’ pages of newspapers. The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph had their respective ideological preferences, but both were within the same, respectable political universe. In the chaotic, open world of today’s Web, there is not the same reliability, yet the dependable organs of public opinion, the major newspapers and broadcast stations, are being increasingly undermined by this same virtual world, when they are not being suborned by their corporate paymasters. If we lose these anchors of the public forum, as is quite possible given market trends, the danger is that ‘public opinion’ will be open to manipulation of rumour and hearsay because of too much information, rather than too little.

Yet it is also possible that the Internet will become more reliable and less open to abuse, either due to cannier consumers, self-regulation or regulation by democratically elected governments, domestically and transnationally. The Internet is not independent of private or public institutions – just as with the world financial system, it would not exist without innumerable technical conventions and rules, and there are already signs of how access can be controlled and supervised, if necessary. The trick is to make sure such control, domestic and global, is democratic and liberal, not that of an authoritarian power such as China, or – Edward Snowden and Julian Assange’s wish for asylum notwithstanding – enemies of the free media such as Venezuela and Ecuador.

A positive prognosis

The long-term prognosis for democracy is actually a positive one, if we, the people, have the political will and savvy to ensure that our elected representatives and civil servants continue to pursue the common good rather than that of special interests or themselves. The economic crisis has tested transnational and national governance in Europe, and many in the political class and even the electorate have failed (witness the bizarre Italian election in February 2013). Yet Europe is still standing, and despite the execrable levels of unemployment around the Mediterranean, violent resistance or protest against governments or Europe has been remarkably mild. Those affected appear to have decided that accepting the social bargain of democracy – on a national and European level – is still the one most likely to produce the most common (and individual) good, in the long run. That patience is not infinite, but so far it has held – it needs to be rewarded with jobs and prosperity. There has to be a remedy for Europe’snationally articulated inequalities, as well as for the domestic increase in inequality that European states share with most other Western democracies, most notably the United States. In Europe, national special interests must not be put before the transnational solidarity that will benefit the commongood.

On a domestic and global level, it bears repeating, democracies need to reassert control over money and capital, whether this means capping bankers’ bonuses, transaction taxes, or cracking down on tax havens and tax loopholes. Financial and fiscal discipline should be enforced for long-term economic benefit, but with consideration of social justice and equity. The public good ultimately comes before the rights of creditors. Bankers and the financial sector should be the servants of the public, not their masters – otherwise democracy succumbs to plutocracy.

Much of the story outside of Europe and the West is one of continuing improvement in the standard of living and the booming of the middle class, which means democracy will likely expand. In the West, economic recovery will most likely confirm or restore the faith of the voters in their democratic systems. The survival of democracy is, however, not a given. We cannot rely solely on objective protections to save our democracy from ourselves, especially in societies with vast economic and social inequalities. We need to ensure that there is a place for the democratic popular will – our will – to assert itself where appropriate, in defending the people, and their democracies, from the threats that they face in a rapidly changing world, both internationally and domestically. The answer to the threat to democracies from without, especially financial and economic forces beyond national control, would be the provision of some sort of international level of democratic control; and the answer to the threat from within, especially vast inequalities in income and hence in power, would be a greater assertion of each society’s control over its collective human and capital resources. Both, as we have seen, are possible. It just takes the political will of the people to make sure they occur. 

Steven Beller is a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University, Washington DC, and a former Research Fellow in History at Peterhouse College, Cambridge.


Is Capitalism a Threat to Democracy?

The idea that authoritarianism attracts workers harmed by the free market, which emerged when the Nazis were in power, has been making a comeback.

In London, in the nineteen-thirties, the émigré Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi was known among his friends as “the apocalyptic chap.” His gloom was understandable. Nearly fifty, he’d had to leave his wife, daughter, and mother behind in Vienna shortly after Austria lurched toward fascism, in 1933. Although he had long edited and contributed to the prestigious Viennese weekly The Austrian Economist, which published such celebrated figures as Friedrich Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter, he had come to discount his career as a thing of “theoretical and practical barrenness,” and blamed himself for failing to diagnose his era’s crucial political conflict. As so often for refugees, money was tight. Despite letters of reference from eminent historians, Polanyi failed to land a professorship or a fellowship, though he did manage to earn thirty-seven pounds co-editing an anti-fascist anthology, which featured essays by W. H. Auden and Reinhold Niebuhr. In his own contribution to the book, he argued that fascism strips democratic politics away from human society so that “only economic life remains,” a skeleton without flesh.

In 1937, he taught in adult-education programs in Kent and Sussex, commuting by bus or train and spending the night at a student’s house if it got too late to return home. The subject was British economic history, which he hadn’t much studied before. As he learned how capitalism had challenged the political system of Great Britain, the first nation in the world to industrialize, he decided that it was no accident that fascism was infecting countries as disparate as Japan, Croatia, and Portugal. Fascism shouldn’t be “ascribed to local causes, national mentalities, or historical backgrounds,” he came to believe. It shouldn’t even be thought of as a political movement. It was, rather, an “ever-given political possibility”—a reflex that could occur in any polity experiencing a certain kind of pain. In Polanyi’s opinion, whenever the profit-making impulse becomes deadlocked with the need to shield people from its harmful side effects, voters are tempted by the “fascist solution”: reconcile profit and security by forfeiting civic freedom. The insight became the keystone of his masterpiece, “The Great Transformation,” which was published in 1944, as the world was coming to terms with the destruction that fascism had wrought.

Today, as in the nineteen-thirties, strongmen are ascendant worldwide, purging civil servants, subverting the judiciary, and bullying the press. In a sweeping, angry new book, “Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?” (Norton), the journalist, editor, and Brandeis professor Robert Kuttner champions Polanyi as a neglected prophet. Like Polanyi, he believes that free markets can be crueller than citizens will tolerate, inflicting a distress that he thinks is making us newly vulnerable to the fascist solution. In Kuttner’s description, however, today’s political impasse is different from that of the nineteen-thirties. It is being caused not by a stalemate between leftist governments and a reactionary business sector but by leftists in government who have reneged on their principles. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Kuttner contends, America’s Democrats, Britain’s Labour Party, and many of Europe’s social democrats have consistently tacked rightward, relinquishing concern for ordinary workers and embracing the power of markets; they have sided with corporations and investors so many times that, by now, workers no longer feel represented by them. When strongmen arrived promising jobs and a shared sense of purpose, working-class voters were ready for the message.

Born in 1886 in Vienna, Karl Polanyi grew up in Budapest, in an assimilated, highly cultured Jewish family. Polanyi’s father, an engineer who became a railroad contractor, was so conscientious that when his business failed, around 1900, he repaid the shareholders, plunging the family into genteel poverty. Polanyi’s mother founded a women’s college, hosted a salon, and had a somewhat chaotic personality that a daughter-in-law once likened to “a book not yet written.” At home, as Gareth Dale recounts in a thoughtful 2016 biography, the family spoke German, French, and a little Hungarian; Karl also learned English, Latin, and Greek as a child. “I was taught tolerance not only by Goethe,” he later recalled, “but also, with seemingly mutually exclusive accents, by Dostoyevsky and John Stuart Mill.”

After university, Polanyi helped to found Hungary’s Radical Citizens’ Party, which called for land redistribution, free trade, and extended suffrage. But he remained enough of a traditionalist to enlist as a cavalry officer shortly after the First World War broke out. At the front, where, he said, “the Russian winter and the blackish steppe made me feel sick at heart,” he read “Hamlet” obsessively, and wrote letters home asking his family to send volumes of Marx, Flaubert, and Locke. After the war, the Radical Citizens took power, but they fumbled it. In the short-lived Communist government that followed, Polanyi was offered a position in the culture ministry by his friend György Lukács, later a celebrated Marxist literary critic.

When the Communists fell, pogroms broke out, and Polanyi fled to Vienna. “He looked like one who looks back on life, not forward to it,” Ilona Duczynska, who became his wife, remembered. Duczynska was a Communist engineer, ten years younger than he was. She had smuggled tsarist diamonds out of Russia in a tube of toothpaste and once borrowed a pistol to assassinate Hungary’s Prime Minister, though he resigned before she could shoot him. She and Polanyi married in 1923 and soon had a daughter.

These were the days of so-called Red Vienna, when the city’s socialist government was providing apartments for the working class and opening new libraries and kindergartens. Polanyi held informal seminars on socialist economics at home. He started writing for The Austrian Economist in 1924, and he was promoted to editor-in-chief a few months before the right-wing takeover sent him into exile. Duczynska remained in Vienna, going underground with a militia, but, in 1936, she, too, emigrated, taking a job as a cook in a London boarding house. In 1940, Bennington College offered Polanyi a lectureship, and he left for Vermont, where his family soon joined him and he began to turn his lecture notes into a book. “Not since 1920 did I have a time so rich in study and development,” he wrote.

Polanyi starts “The Great Transformation” by giving capitalism its due. For all but eighteen months of the century prior to the First World War, he writes, a web of international trade and investment kept peace among Europe’s great powers. Money crossed borders easily, thanks to the gold standard, a promise by each nation’s central bank to sell gold at a fixed price in its own currency. This both harmonized trade between countries and stabilized relative currency values. If a nation started to sell more goods than it bought, gold streamed in, expanding the money supply, heating up the economy, and raising prices high enough to discourage foreign buyers—at which point, in a correction so smooth it almost seemed natural, exports sank back down to pre-boom levels. The trouble was that the system could be gratuitously cruel. If a country went into a recession or its currency weakened, the only remedy was to attract foreign money by forcing prices down, cutting government spending, or raising interest rates—which, in effect, meant throwing people out of work. “No private suffering, no restriction of sovereignty, was deemed too great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity,” Polanyi wrote.

The system was sustainable politically only as long as those whose lives it ruined didn’t have a say. But, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the right to vote spread. In the twenties and thirties, governments began trying to protect citizens’ jobs from shifts in international prices by raising tariffs, so that, in the system’s final years, it hardened national borders instead of opening them, and engendered what Polanyi called a “new crustacean type of nation,” which turned away from international trade, making first one world war, and then another, inevitable.

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In Vienna, Polanyi had heard socialism dismissed as utopian, on the ground that no central authority could efficiently manage millions of different wishes, resources, and capabilities. In “The Great Transformation,” he swivelled this popgun around. What was utopian, he declared, was “the concept of a self-regulating market.” Human life wasn’t as orderly as mathematics, and only a goggle-eyed idealist would think it wise to lash people to a mechanism like the gold standard and then turn the crank. For most of human history, he observed, money and the exchange of goods had been embedded within culture, religion, and politics. The experiment of subordinating a nation to a self-adjusting market hadn’t even been attempted until Britain tried it, in the mid-eighteen-thirties, and that effort had required a great deal of coördination and behind-the-scenes management. “Laissez-faire,” Polanyi earnestly joked, “was planned.”

On the other hand, Polanyi believed that resistance to market forces, which he dubbed “the countermovement,” truly was spontaneous and ad hoc. He pointed to the motley of late-nineteenth-century measures—inspecting food and drink, subsidizing irrigation, regulating coal-mine ventilation, requiring vaccinations, protecting juvenile chimney sweeps, and so on—that were instituted to housebreak capitalism. Because such restraints went against the laws of supply and demand, they were despised by defenders of laissez-faire, who, Polanyi noticed, usually argued “that the incomplete application of its principles was the reason for every and any difficulty laid to its charge.” But what was the alternative? Once the laissez-faire machine started running, it cheerfully annihilated the people and the natural environment that it made use of, unless it was restrained.

Polanyi offered the example of the enclosure movement in sixteenth-century England, when landowners tore down villages and turned common lands into private pastures. The changes brought efficiencies that raised the land’s food yield as well as its value, in the long term improving life for everyone. Enclosure was a good thing, in other words; the numbers said so. In the short term, however, it dispossessed peasants who couldn’t immediately improvise a new living, and it was only because of a countermovement—led in piecemeal fashion by the monarchy, in a long, losing battle with Parliament—that more people didn’t die of exposure and starvation. If you argued that resistance did not compute, you would be right, but the countermovement, though it couldn’t stop progress, shielded people by slowing it down. It made enclosure so gradual that, even three centuries later, the poet John Clare was lamenting its advance in his sonnets.

In the nineteen-thirties, when Polanyi was first formulating his critique, the British economist John Maynard Keynes was likewise arguing that capitalist economies aren’t self-adjusting. The markets for labor, goods, and money, he showed, don’t find equilibriums independently but through interactions with one another that can have unfortunate, counterintuitive side effects. In hard times, economies tend to retrench, just when stimulus is most needed; the richer they get, the less likely they are to invest enough to sustain their wealth. During the Depression, Keynes made the case that governments should deficit-spend their way out of recessions. By the time Polanyi’s book was published, the Keynesian view had become orthodoxy. For the next few decades, the world’s leading economies were tightly managed by their governments. America’s top marginal tax rate stayed at ninety-one per cent until 1964, and anti-usury laws kept a ceiling on interest rates until the late seventies. The memory of the financial chaos of the thirties, and of the fascism that it gave rise to, was still vivid, and the Soviet Union loomed as an alternative, should the Western democracies fail to treat their workers well.

In terms of international monetary systems, too, Keynesianism held sway. In 1944, at the Bretton Woods Conference, Keynes helped to negotiate a way of harmonizing exchange rates that gave national governments enough elbow room to boost their domestic economies when necessary. Only America continued to redeem its currency with gold. Other nations pegged their currencies to the dollar (making it their reserve currency), but they were free to adjust their currencies’ values within limits when the need arose. Countries were allowed, and sometimes even required, to impose capital controls, measures that limited the cross-border flow of investment capital. With investors unable to yank money suddenly from one country to another, governments were free to spur growth with low interest rates and to spend on social programs without fear that inflation-averse capitalists would sell off their nations’ bonds. So weak was the political power of investors that France, Britain, and America let inflation shrink the value of their war debts considerably. In France, the economist Thomas Piketty has quipped, the period amounted to “capitalism without capitalists.”

The result—highly inconvenient for free-market fundamentalists—was prosperity. In the three decades following the Second World War, per-capita output grew faster in Western Europe and North America than ever before or since. There were no significant banking or financial crises. The real income of Europeans rose as much as it had in the previous hundred and fifty years, and American unemployment, which had ranged between fourteen and twenty-five per cent in the thirties, dropped to an average of 4.6 per cent in the fifties. The new wealth was widely shared, too; income inequality plummeted across the developed world. And with the plenty came calm. The economic historian Barry Eichengreen, in his new book, “The Populist Temptation” (Oxford), reports that in twenty advanced nations no populist leader—which he defines as a politician who is “anti-elite, authoritarian, and nativist”—took office during this golden era, and that a far narrower share of votes went to extremist parties than before or after.

“This was the road once taken,” Kuttner writes. “There was no economic need for a different one.” Nevertheless, we strayed—or, rather, in Kuttner’s telling, we were driven off the road after capitalists grabbed the steering wheel away from the Keynesians. The year 1973, in his opinion, marked “the end of the postwar social contract.” Politicians began snipping away restraints on investors and financiers, and the economy returned to spasming and sputtering. Between 1973 and 1992, per-capita income growth in the developed world fell to half of what it had been between 1950 and 1973. Income inequality rebounded. By 2010, the real median earnings of prime-age American workingmen were four per cent lower than they had been in 1970. American women’s earnings rose for a bit longer, as more women made their way into the workforce, but declined after 2000. And, as Polanyi would have predicted, faith in democracy slipped. Kuttner warns that support for right-wing extremists in Western Europe is even higher today than it was in the nineteen-thirties.

But was Keynesianism pushed, or did it stumble? Kuttner’s indignation about its fall from grace is more straightforward than the course of events that led to it. In the years following the Second World War, Europe was swimming with dollars, thanks to the Marshall Plan and American military aid to Europe. Beyond America’s jurisdiction, those dollars slipped free of its capital controls, and in the nineteen-sixties investors began to sling them from country to country as impetuously as in the days before Bretton Woods, punitively dumping the bonds of any government that tried to run an interest rate lower than those of its peers. The cost of the Vietnam War sparked inflation in America, and the dollar’s second life as the world’s reserve currency risked pushing the inflation even higher. When America fell into recession in 1970, the Federal Reserve tried to boost the country out of it by dropping interest rates, and America became a target of opportunity for speculators: capital fled the country, taking gold with it. By May, 1971, the United States was facing its first merchandise trade deficit since 1893, an indication that the high dollar was discouraging foreign buyers. Unwilling to pacify investors by inflicting austerity on voters, President Richard Nixon uncoupled the dollar from gold, ending the Bretton Woods agreement. Then, in October, 1973, Arab nations, upset about America’s solidarity with Israel during the Yom Kippur War, embargoed oil sales to the United States, and the price of crude nearly quadrupled in the space of three months. Food prices skyrocketed, and, as wallets were pinched, the country tumbled into another recession.

At this juncture, a new economic monster appeared: stagflation, a chimera of inflation, recession, and unemployment. Keynesian economists, who didn’t think that high unemployment and inflation could coëxist, were at a loss for how to handle it. The predicament provided an opening for their critics, most notably Milton Friedman, who argued that incessant government stimulation of the economy risked promoting not only inflation but the expectation of inflation, which could then spiral out of control. Friedman declared Keynesianism discredited and demanded that the government refrain from tampering with the economy, other than to manage the money supply.

In 1974, Alan Greenspan, President Gerald Ford’s economic adviser and an acolyte of Ayn Rand, likewise urged resisting political pressure to help the economy grow. “Inflation is our domestic public enemy No. 1,” Ford declared, and the Federal Reserve raised interest rates. Five years later, when a revolution in Iran set off a second spike in oil prices, a new round of inflation, and yet another recession, President Jimmy Carter’s Federal Reserve chair, Paul Volcker, raised interest rates again and again, to as high as twenty per cent. By 1982, America’s G.D.P. was shrinking 2.2 per cent a year, and unemployment was higher than it had been since the Great Depression. The nation had gone back to stabilizing its currency the old-fashioned way—by throwing people out of work—and utopian faith in self-regulating free markets had made a comeback. Kuttner thinks that this was a terrible mistake, arguing that the inflation of the seventies was limited to particular sectors of the economy such as food and oil. That sounds a little like special pleading. It’s not clear how Ford and Carter could have resisted the pressure they were under to find a new policy solution once it was clear that the old one wasn’t working.

In time, Keynesians adapted their models—one adjustment took into account Friedman’s discovery of the dangers posed by the expectation of inflation—and the resulting synthesis, New Keynesianism, is now canonical. Both the Bush and the Obama Administrations adopted Keynesian policies in response to the financial crisis of 2008. But when stagflation flummoxed the Keynesians it cost them their near-monopoly on political advice-giving, and laissez-faire was rereleased into the political sphere. In January, 1974, the United States removed constraints on sending capital abroad. A 1978 Supreme Court decision overturned most state laws against usury. By the early twenty-first century, Kuttner charges, every New Deal regulation on finance was either “repealed or weakened by non-enforcement.” Starting in the eighties, developing nations found free-market doctrine written into their loan agreements: bankers refused to extend credit unless the nations promised to lift capital controls, balance their budgets, limit taxes and social spending, and aim to sell more goods abroad—an uncanny replica of the austerity terms enforced under the gold standard. The set of policies became known as the Washington Consensus. The idea was pain in the short term for the sake of progress in the long term, but a 2011 meta-analysis was unable to find statistically significant evidence that the trade-off is worth it. Even if it is worth it, Polanyi would have recommended tempering the short-term pain. From 2010, when austerity measures were first imposed on Greece, to 2016, its G.D.P. declined 35.6 per cent, according to the World Bank. A federally appointed panel is now pushing for a similar approach in Puerto Rico.

There is no shortage of villains in Kuttner’s narrative: financial deregulation; supply-side tax cuts; the decline of trade unions; the Democratic Party, which, by zigging left on identity politics and zagging right on economics, left conservative white working-class voters amenable to Donald Trump. Perhaps the most vexed issue Kuttner discusses, however, is trade policy—whether American workers should be protected against cheap foreign goods and labor.

The contours of the problem call to mind Polanyi’s account of enclosures in early-modern England. Half an hour with a supply-and-demand graph shows that free trade is better for every nation, developed or developing, no matter how much an individual businessperson might wish for a special tariff to protect her line of work. In a 2012 survey, eighty-five per cent of economists agreed that, in the long run, the boons of free trade “are much larger than any effects on employment.” But although free trade benefits a country over all, it almost always benefits some citizens more than—and even at the expense of—others. The proportion of low-skilled labor in America is smaller than in most countries that trade with America; economic theory therefore predicts that international trade will, on aggregate, make low-skilled workers in the United States worse off. The U.S. government has, since 1962, compensated workers laid off because of free trade, but the benefit has never been adequate; only four people were certified to receive it during its first decade. In a 2016 paper, “The China Shock,” the economists David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson wrote that, for every additional hundred dollars of Chinese goods imported to an area, a manufacturing worker is likely to lose fifty-five dollars of income, while gaining only six dollars in government help.

In a laissez-faire utopia, dislodged workers would relocate or take jobs in other industries, but workers hurt by rivalry with China are doing neither. Maybe they don’t have the resources to move; maybe the flood of Chinese-made goods is so extensive that there are no unaffected manufacturing sectors for them to switch into. The authors of “The China Shock” calculate that, between 1999 and 2011, trade with China destroyed between two million and 2.4 million American jobs; Kuttner quotes even higher estimates. nafta, meanwhile, lowered the wage growth of American high-school dropouts in affected industries by sixteen percentage points. In “Why Liberalism Failed” (Yale), the political scientist Patrick J. Deneen denounces the assumption that “increased purchasing power of cheap goods will compensate for the absence of economic security.”

Kuttner follows Polanyi in attacking free-market claims of mathematic purity. “Literally no nation has industrialized by relying on free markets,” he writes. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton recommended that America encourage new branches of manufacturing by taxing imports and subsidizing domestic production. Even Britain, the world’s first great champion of free trade, started off protectionist. Kuttner believes that America stopped supporting its manufacturing sector partly because it got into the habit, during the Cold War, of rewarding foreign allies with access to American consumers, and eventually decided that exports of financial services, rather than of manufactured goods, would be the country’s future. Toward the end of the century, as American manufacturers saw the writing on the wall, they shifted production abroad.

Kuttner doesn’t give a full hearing to the usual reply by defenders of laissez-faire, which is that a transition from goods to services is inevitable in a maturing economy—that the efficiency of American manufacturing means that it would likely be shedding workers no matter what the government did. Even Eichengreen, a critic of globalization, notes, in “The Populist Temptation,” that, if you graph the share of the German workforce employed in manufacturing from 1970 to 2012, you see a steady, grim decline very similar to that of its American counterpart, despite the fact that Germany has long spent heavily on apprenticeship and vocational training. The industrial revolution created widely shared wealth almost magically at its dawn: when an unemployed farmworker took a job in a factory, his power to make things multiplied, along with his earning power, without his having to learn much. But, as factories grew more efficient, fewer workers were needed to run them. One study has attributed eighty-seven per cent of lost manufacturing jobs to improved productivity.

When a worker leaves a factory, her power to create wealth stops being multiplied. The only way to increase it again is through education—by teaching her to become a sommelier, say, or an anesthesiologist. But efficiency gains are notoriously harder to come by in service industries than in manufacturing ones. There are only so many leashes a dog walker can hold at one time. As a result, if an economy deindustrializes without securing a stable manufacturing core, its productivity may erode. The dynamic has caused stagnation in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, and there are signs of a comparable weakening of America’s earning power.

Meanwhile, in the factories that remain, machines have grown more complex; the few workers they employ need to be better educated, further widening the gap between educated and uneducated workers. Kuttner dismisses this labor-skills explanation for job loss as an “alibi” with “an insulting subtext”: “If your economic life has gone to hell, it’s your fault.” This is intemperate but, in Kuttner’s defense, he has been warning American politicians to protect manufacturing jobs since 1991, and has been enlisting Polanyi in the cause for at least as long. Moreover, he has a point: to talk about productivity-induced job loss when challenged to explain trade-induced job loss is to change the subject. Economists estimate that advances in automation explain only thirty to forty per cent of the premium that a college degree now adds to wages. And though Eichengreen is right about manufacturing’s declining share of the German workforce, it still stood at twenty per cent in 2012, which is roughly where the American share stood three decades earlier, and the German decline has been less steep. Somehow, Germany’s concern for its manufacturing workforce made a difference.

In any case, if one’s concern is populism, it may not matter whether jobs have been lost to trade competition or to automation. In areas where more industrial robots have been introduced, one analysis shows, voters were more likely to choose Trump in 2016. According to another analysis, if competition with Chinese imports had been somehow halved, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania would likely have chosen Hillary Clinton that year. Economic explanations like these have been challenged. In April, the political scientist Diana C. Mutz published a paper finding that Trump voters were no more likely than Clinton ones to have suffered a personal financial setback; she concluded that Trump’s victory was more likely caused by white anxiety about loss of status and social dominance. But it’s not surprising that Trump voters weren’t basing their decisions on their personal circumstances, because voters almost never do. And Mutz’s own results showed that the factors most likely to lead to a Trump vote included pessimism about the economy and preferring Trump’s position on China to Clinton’s. It may not be possible to untangle economic anxiety and a more tribal mind-set.

Casting about for a Polanyi-style countermovement to temper the ruthlessness of laissez-faire, Kuttner doesn’t rule out tariffs. They’re economically inefficient, but so are unions, and, for a follower of Polanyi, efficiency isn’t the only consideration. A decision about a nation’s economic life, the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik writes, in “Straight Talk on Trade” (Princeton), “may entail trading off competing social objectives—such as stability versus innovation—or making distributional choices”; that is, deciding who gains at whose expense. Such a decision should therefore be made by elected politicians rather than by economists. America imposed export quotas on Japan in the seventies and eighties, to the alarm of headline writers at the time: “protectionist threat,” the Times warned. But Rodrik, looking back, judges the measures to have been reasonable ad-hoc defenses—“necessary responses to the distributional and adjustment challenges posed by the emergence of new trade relationships.”

Trump’s chief trade negotiator served on the Reagan team that administered quotas against Japan. A similar approach today, however, seems unlikely to work on China, whose economy is much more messily enmeshed with America’s. You probably can’t name as many Chinese brands as Japanese ones, even though you probably buy more Chinese-made products, because they are sold to Americans by American companies. American workers may wish they had been shielded from the effects of trade with China, but American businesses, by and large, don’t. Perhaps that’s why Trump has escalated from a tariff on steel and aluminum to erratic threats of a trade war. To achieve his campaign goal of bringing manufacturing jobs home from China, he will have to not only impose tariffs but also convince multinationals that the tariffs will stay in place beyond the end of his Administration. Only then will executives calculate that they can’t just wait it out—that they have no choice but to incur the enormous costs and capital losses of abandoning investments in China and making new ones here. It’s hard to imagine such a scheme working, unless Trump establishes a political command over the private sector not seen in America since the forties. That can’t be ruled out, given the state of affairs in Russia, China, Hungary, and Turkey, but it seems more likely that Trump’s bluster will merely motivate businesses to be deferential to him, in pursuit of favorable treatment.

“Basically there are two solutions,” Polanyi wrote in 1935. “The extension of the democratic principle from politics to economics, or the abolition of the democratic ‘political sphere’ altogether.” In other words, socialism or fascism. The choice may not be so stark, however. During America’s golden age of full employment, the economy came, in structural terms, as close as it ever has to socialism, but it remained capitalist at its core, despite the government’s restraining hand. The result was that workers shared directly in the country’s growing wealth, whereas today proposals for fostering greater financial equality hinge on taxing winners in order to fund programs that compensate losers. Such redistributive measures, Kuttner observes, are only “second bests.” They don’t do much for social cohesion: winners resent the loss of earnings; losers, the loss of dignity.

Can we return to an equality in workers’ primary incomes rather than to one brought about by secondary redistribution? In a recent essay for the journal Democracy, the Roosevelt Institute fellow Jennifer Harris recommends reimagining international trade as an engine for this rather than as an obstacle to it. When negotiating trade deals, for instance, governments could make going to bat for multinationals conditional on their agreeing to, say, pay their workers a higher fraction of what they pay executives.

Failing that, we’d be better off with redistributive programs that are universal—parental leave, national health care—rather than targeted. Benefits available to everyone help people without making them feel like charity cases. Kuttner reports great things from Scandinavia, where governments support workers directly—through wage subsidies, retraining sabbaticals, and temporary public jobs—rather than by constraining employers’ power to fire people. “We won’t protect jobs,” Sweden’s labor minister recently told the Times. “But we will protect workers.” Income inequality in Scandinavia is lower than here, and a larger proportion of citizens work. Maybe a government can insure higher pay for its workers by treating them as if they were, in and of themselves, valuable. True, Denmark’s spending on its labor policies has at times risen to as high as 4.5 per cent of its G.D.P., more than the share America spends on defense, and studies show that diverse countries such as ours find it harder to muster social altruism than more racially and culturally homogenous ones do. Nonetheless, programs like Social Security and Medicare, instituted when a communitarian ethic was still strong in American politics, remain popular. Why not try for more? It might make sense even if the numbers don’t add up.



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