YopuTube 【麥玉潔辣晚報】蘇利文自爆:無論明里暗裡 美國幾十年來改變中國的努力都沒有成功｜美高官認了 對中國這事 「都沒有成功」｜郭正亮.栗正傑.介文汲深度剖析?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFJI0sirys8

国家安全顾问杰克沙利文关于美中关系未来的讲话和问答

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/01/30/remarks-and-qa-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-future-of- 中美关系/

2024 年 1 月 30 日

外交关系委员会

华盛顿特区。

先生。 沙利文：至少我有勇气在布鲁金斯学会而不是在 CFR 发表演讲。 所以——（笑声）——

迈克，我想说谢谢你让我回到 CFR。 感谢苏珊、库尔特、夏琳和史蒂夫，感谢你们让我回到加州大学圣地亚哥分校中国论坛，自该论坛开幕以来，我有幸实际参加了该论坛。 我想说一月份的圣地亚哥比一月份的华盛顿要好一点，但我们就在这里凑合吧。 

我今天的目的不是试图公布新的中国战略，而是更简单的事情：在幕后与大家分享过去三年我们如何努力实施我们的战略，以及我们在 2024 年的预期。 在此过程中，在不直接回答迈克提出的问题的情况下，也许可以为工厂提供一点帮助，在接下来的几天里，当您解决这些非常困难的问题时，它们可以有所帮助。

 我想先退后一步。

在为拜登政府服务之前，我们许多现在在政府任职的人——包括我自己、库尔特和其他人——都在以书面形式和在这样的会议上重新审视我们长期对华政策背后的假设。 一旦进入政府，我们就沉浸在最新的情报、专业知识和分析中。

 我们认为，中华人民共和国是唯一一个既有意愿重塑国际秩序，又有经济、外交、军事和技术实力来实现这一目标的国家。 我们看到中国试图在高科技领域“赶上并超越”美国； 它正在进行历史上最大规模的和平时期军事集结； 中国在国内更加高压，而在国外则更加强势，包括在南海、东海以及台湾海峡。 我们看到中华人民共和国努力让世界更加依赖中国，同时减少自己对世界的依赖。 我们看到它正在采取措施调整国际体系以适应其自身的体系和偏好。

我们还看到了一些真正引人注目的事情，那就是中华人民共和国认为美国正处于最终衰落之中——我们的工业基础已经被掏空，我们对盟友和伙伴的承诺被削弱，美国正在苦苦挣扎 为了应对百年一遇的大流行，北京的许多人公开宣称“东方正在崛起，西方正在衰落”。

当我们上任时，我们继承了上届政府的做法，更新了对中国挑战的范围和性质的诊断，但没有充分制定应对这一挑战的战略和工具。 这种做法有时更具对抗性，而不是竞争性，而且往往低估了对维持有效的中国战略至关重要的盟友和伙伴的价值。

 但我们不想回到早先与中国的做法，这种做法基于对其发展轨迹更加乐观的假设，有时优先考虑避免摩擦而不是追求美国的国家利益。 因此，我们制定了自己的方法，布林肯部长在几年前的一次演讲中提出了这一方法——投资、协调、竞争——力求加强我们的竞争地位，确保我们的利益和价值观，同时谨慎管理这一重要关系。

在过去的三年里，我们已经实施了这种方法。 我们通过在基础设施、芯片和科学以及清洁能源方面的历史性立法，对美国国内实力的基础进行了影响深远的投资，同时解决了中国的非市场行为，并采取措施确保美国的领导地位 技术和经济增长的源泉。

 我们相信我们的方法已经产生了成果。 自 2019 年以来，美国对半导体和清洁能源生产的大规模投资增长了 20 倍。新制造项目的建设支出已经翻了一番。 展望未来十年，我们估计新的公共和私人投资将达到 3.5 万亿美元，这些投资将由我刚才提到的历史性立法中的投资释放。

 在国外，我们试图以几年前不太可能、甚至不可想象的方式加强与印太盟友和伙伴的关系。 我们推出了 AUKUS。 我们升高了四边形。 与越南、菲律宾、印度、印尼等关系升级。

 我们与日本和韩国发起了历史性的三边会谈，最终在拜登总统在戴维营主持的历史性峰会上达到了顶峰。

 我们与太平洋岛屿领导人举行了多次峰会就像东盟一样。

 我们的地区盟友和合作伙伴则押注于美国的经济活力。 自本届政府上台以来，他们已宣布向美国投资近 2000 亿美元。

 我们还努力连接我们的欧洲和印度-太平洋联盟。 我们与七国集团合作伙伴一起采取集体措施，降低经济风险，实现多元化，摆脱战略依赖，而不是脱钩。 我们与我们的盟友和伙伴一起强调了维护台海和平与稳定的重要性。

 我们还努力确保我们公司正在开发的先进敏感技术不会成为漏洞的来源。 我们对关键技术实施了精心设计的出口限制； 专注于先进的半导体制造工具——顺便说一句，当我第一次真正沉浸在半导体制造设备的问题时，这个主题是早期加州大学圣地亚哥分校论坛的核心主题； 超级计算能力； 以及对军事现代化至关重要的最先进芯片。

 我们还采取措施规范技术领域的对外投资，并加强美国外国投资委员会对关键技术的关注，以确保入境投资真正解决不断变化的国家安全挑战——入境投资的筛选制度。

 这些步骤不是为了保护主义，也不是为了阻止任何人。 从长远来看，它们对我们的国家安全至关重要。

 现在，这些行动的背景是大流行后最强劲的复苏，也是世界主要经济体中通胀最低的国家之一。 多年来，经济学家一直预测中国的国内生产总值将在本十年或未来十年内超过美国。 现在这些预测正变得越来越遥远。 由于中国面临着一系列挑战，一些人表示这一时刻可能永远不会到来。

 这让我想到了一个关键点：此时此刻，美国再次展示了其恢复力和重塑的能力。

 但这还不是故事的全部。 这就是我今天要发表的言论的真正关键之处。

 当我们采取这些步骤来提高我们的竞争地位时，我们的目标是以一种为世界上最重要的关系之一（也许是世界上最重要的关系）建立稳定性的方式。 事实上，我们相信，我们在国内的投资以及我们深化与国外盟友和伙伴关系的工作实际上为与中国进行更有效的外交创造了条件。

 可持续的中国政策就是要同时牢记多种真理，并反复努力调和它们。 我们对与中国关系中的竞争结构动态有着清醒的认识。 但我们也敏锐地意识到，美国和中国在经济上相互依存，在解决跨国问题和减少冲突风险方面拥有共同利益。

 我们意识到，几十年来塑造或改变中华人民共和国的努力，无论是暗示的还是明确的，都没有成功。 我们预计，在可预见的未来，中国将成为世界舞台上的主要参与者。 这意味着即使我们竞争，我们也必须找到彼此共同生活的方法。

 与中华人民共和国的竞争不一定会导致冲突、对抗或新的冷战。 美国可以一方面采取措施推进其及其盟友和伙伴的利益和价值观，另一方面负责任地管理竞争。 能够做到这两件事是我们方法的核心。 事实上，美国拥有数十年在我们的利益需要时与我们的竞争对手交谈甚至合作的经验。

 去年，我们一直在借鉴这种经验。 虽然“管理竞争”感觉像是一个抽象的口号，但理解它如何转化为行动的最佳方法是“放大”2023 年。

 今年伊始，两国关系就处于历史低点。 一年前的这个星期，一个中国间谍气球飞越美国。 我们过去和现在都对中国在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时向其提供致命援助深感担忧。 2022 年 8 月，中华人民共和国举行了历史性且史无前例（但从积极意义上来说并非历史性）的军事演习，之后一系列的两岸危机似乎迫在眉睫。

 所有这些都阻碍了拜登总统和习主席巴厘岛峰会的进展。 高层沟通停止，更不用说军事关系或禁毒或气候合作了——所有这些都被中华人民共和国冻结了。

 我们着手稳定两国关系，同时不牺牲我们加强联盟、积极竞争和捍卫我们利益的能力。

 去年5月开始，我们开启了密集外交时期。 这是全员齐心协力的努力整个内阁的工作涵盖了我们与中华人民共和国关系的各个方面。 我们的目标不是掩盖我们的分歧。 相反，我们的目标是解决误解和沟通不畅，避免重大意外，重新开放已失效的渠道，并更清楚地向彼此传达我们各自的立场和利益。 我们不仅寻求增加沟通的数量，而且寻求提高沟通的质量。

 5月份，我与王毅主任在维也纳呆了两天，帮助两国关系恢复了一些正常状态。 在维也纳，我们就高层接触的粗略路线图达成共识，以执行拜登总统和习主席在巴厘岛提出的议程——双方当时都希望最终能在圣保罗举行领导人级别会议。 弗朗西斯科将于今年晚些时候出席亚太经合组织会议。

 在接下来的几个月里，我们举行了一系列重要会议。

 六月，布林肯国务卿前往北京会见了习近平主席和高级外交政策官员，努力在一段紧张时期后稳定局势。

 7 月，国务卿耶伦前往北京，与中国新的经济领导层建立关系。 同月，气候特使约翰?克里前往重新开放停滞数月之久的气候渠道。

 随后，雷蒙多部长于 8 月访问了中国，以推进我们的商业关系，并强调我们致力于在不切断中美经济关系的情况下保护对国家安全有影响的关键技术。

当时批评人士称，这次旅行是单方面的，但我们的策略是利用这些会议开启双向交流，而事实也正是如此。

 这种密集的外交是为了解决棘手问题，而不是修补关系。 我们直接表达了我们的分歧，包括中国对俄罗斯对乌克兰战争和海峡两岸问题的支持。

我们没有撤回以国家安全为重点的措施，例如限制对外投资和更新出口管制。 相反，我们利用这些会议作为机会来解释这些措施是什么，但几乎同样重要的是，它们不是什么，这是企图破坏中华人民共和国的繁荣和发展。 这些措施并非如此，我们在这些会议上向我们的同行明确解释了这一点。

我们还利用这些会议寻找空间来协调我们利益重叠的问题。

9月，我和王毅主任在马耳他再次会面。 我们为在旧金山举行的领导人会议制定了路线，并阐述了我们希望在禁毒和军用渠道等问题上实现的目标。

在接下来的几周里，多数党领袖舒默率领两党代表团访问了中国，中国也派出了一批官员前往美国，其中包括副总统、副总理和王毅主任，他们参加了为期两天的会议 与布林肯国务卿和我本人一起。

正如你从迈克那里听到的，所有这一切都在拜登总统和习主席在加利福尼亚州伍德赛德举行的峰会上达到了顶峰，这次会议在三个主要问题上取得了进展。

一是拜登总统和习主席重启禁毒合作。 从那时起，我们看到北京采取了初步措施，阻止用于制造芬太尼的前体化学品的流动，我们希望并需要看到这一进展继续下去。 美国和中华人民共和国之间的第一个跨部门禁毒工作组今天在北京举行会议，我们的目标是就打击这种可怕的毒品开展执法合作。

其次，拜登总统和习主席宣布恢复冻结一年多的两军沟通。 我们的参谋长联席会议主席现已与他的同行进行了交谈，我们已经恢复了一些关键的操作员级别机制。 现在的问题是，即使面对未来的动荡，这种情况是否还会持续下去。 就我们而言，我们将继续证明军队之间的沟通在任何时候都至关重要，尤其是在紧张时期。

第三，在伍德赛德峰会上，我们的领导人宣布了一项旨在管理人工智能风险的新对话，该对话将于春季开始。

正如迈克提到的，上周末我在曼谷会见了王毅主任，以跟进伍德赛德峰会并推进这三个领域的努力。

细致而顽强的外交对于管理两个大国之间战略竞争中普遍存在的摩擦是必要的。 这项工作的一些风险可能是不可预见的，也可能是令人意外的。 其他风险更为明显，包括南海和东海的摩擦以及经济和技术的动向和反制措施。

最重大的风险将是台湾海峡的危机，特别是考虑到北京在台湾和台湾海峡的军事活动增加。周围的空气和水域。 在这方面，密集的外交也很重要。

就在几周前，台湾举行了历史性的选举，没有发生任何重大的两岸事件，部分原因是华盛顿、北京和台北等各方都在努力减少对各自意图的误解和误解。 这是很少有人在 2022 年 8 月预见到的结果，当时大多数人预计两岸局势会变得更加紧张，而不是减弱。 但这并不能保证未来的趋势，而且风险仍然存在。 因此，我们必须继续努力，加强外交和威慑。

明年，就像过去三年一样，我们将继续对侵犯人权、强迫劳动和防扩散采取行动。 我们将对中国支持俄罗斯对乌克兰战争以及帮助俄罗斯重建国防工业基础的努力保持警惕，并采取必要措施予以应对。

如果中国继续在南海、东海以及台湾海峡进行挑衅，我们将与盟友和伙伴密切合作，反击世界上最重要水道的和平与稳定面临的风险，并大声疾呼。 我们将继续在国际法允许的范围内通过飞行、航行和行动来维护该地区的航行自由。 我们将继续采取旨在保护我们国家安全的量身定制的国家安全措施。

即使我们这样做，我们仍将致力于继续与中国密切互动，这有助于双方管理分歧领域并在我们利益一致的领域展开合作。

我们不打算重建早期双边关系中现已过时的结构和机制。 我们绝对不会为了对话而对话。 但我们确实认为，在精心挑选的离散领域发起和引导一定数量的工作层面磋商是有价值的，以促进我们的利益并取得成果。 这就是我们今天在禁毒方面使用的方法——这种方法植根于此时此地，而不是怀念过去。

未来一段时期，我们希望能够与中国合作，深化危机沟通机制，减少冲突风险。 我们已准备好在气候、健康安全、全球宏观经济稳定以及人工智能带来的风险等新挑战方面进行协调。 我们还将与北京讨论从红海到朝鲜半岛等具有挑战性的地区和全球问题。 我们还将努力推动一系列双边问题的进展，包括民间关系。

最后我要指出的是，这一切都不会容易，并且会有紧张的时候。 在这样的竞争中这是不可避免的，而且根本不会以干净利落和决定性的最终状态解决。 正如我所指出的，有一件事是肯定的：一路上将会有惊喜。

我们将像去年一样继续努力管理比赛。 我们将继续投资于我们在国内的实力，并在国外深化我们的全球联盟和伙伴关系网络。

我向您描述的方法并不是什么重大的战略转变。 这是我们从上任之日起就开始做出的努力。 对于美国的治国之道来说，这也不是什么新鲜事。 离得很远。 这种做法本身就是美国独有的，植根于数十年的历史、外交和来之不易的经验。 它也植根于两党合作，因为当美国在两党强有力支持的立场上进行战略竞争时，在所有人齐心协力为国家服务时，我们总是会变得更强大。

所以我们打算坚持这一策略。 我们打算采取必要措施来保护我们的利益和盟友，同时有效管理与中国的竞争，这不仅有利于美国，也有利于全球稳定。 这是我们的承诺。 这就是我们试图做的。

今天，我的目标只是向您介绍我们如何在实践中尝试执行这一目标，以便我们能够超越宽泛的口号，并落实到由来自世界各地的令人难以置信的团队组成的实际日常辛勤工作。 整个美国政府，无论是职业政府还是任命的政府，都在努力工作。 我必须说，环顾这个房间，在来自两党、私营部门和公共部门以及各行各业的众多人士的支持和建议下，我们已经做到了这一点。 这是我们在前进过程中继续取得成功的唯一途径。

 感谢您今天给我发言的机会，我期待着这次谈话。 （掌声。）

先生。 哈德利：杰克，谢谢你和我们在一起。 谢谢您的评论。 我认为我们都更了解您在中国政策方面所制定的内容以及您所取得的成功。

 我们要去做什么我要做的是向这里的杰克问三四个问题。 然后我们将转向观众回答你们的问题。 这一切都记录在案。 我们会尽量在 7:45 准时结束。 我将继续当晚剩下的活动。

首先让我问你，如果有的话，你是否愿意告诉我们你最近在泰国与中国外交部长王毅会面的情况。 今晚有什么重大突破要报告吗？ （笑声）你想在聚集的群众面前发布什么消息吗？

先生。 苏利文：嗯，首先，我们吃了一顿非常美味的饭。 所以那很好。 （笑声。）

你知道，这是我与王毅的第三轮长谈——第一次是在维也纳，第二次是在马耳他，然后是在曼谷。 在接下来的每一轮谈判中，我认为我们已经逐渐达到了搁置谈话要点并真正进行战略对话的地步。

就下一步而言，会议的主要内容实际上是确定启动人工智能对话，美国和中国将共同努力管理风险。 这将在今年春天开始。 所以我们讨论了其中的要素。

第二，我们有机会深入探讨两岸问题，分享各自立场。 我会保持谨慎。 众所周知，这里布满了可供公开谈论的地雷。 而且，我想尊重频道的自由裁量权。 但我认为这是关于该主题的一次非常有用、直接和坦诚的对话。

然后，我们显然也有机会谈论时事——红海时事、朝鲜半岛时事，以及我们对这两个地方不稳定的担忧。 我想说的是，这些对话的质量和特点，以及关于乌克兰战争的相当直接、在某种程度上密集的对话，我认为帮助我们双方留下了我们不同意或意见不一致的感觉。 一切方面，但还有很多工作需要推进。

我要说的最后一点是：我们同意拜登总统和习主席应该讲话，并且应该尽快通过电话讲话。 我认为伍德赛德承认，领导者之间的对话确实是无可替代的——我的意思是，在伍德赛德的那次会议过程中，这一要素对于有效管理领导者的重要性变得如此明显。 美中政策。 因此，我们都同意我们会向我们的领导汇报，并且我们会尽快给他们打电话。

先生。 哈德利：太好了。 我想问你关于台湾问题的问题。 当然，他们最近在台湾举行了选举。 在座的一些人对这些选举的重要性发表了很多评论。 你怎么看他们？ 您认为这个结果可能会对我们处理两岸关系的能力产生什么影响？

先生。 沙利文：嗯，你知道，我们在公开和私下场合都明确、直接地向所有利益相关者表示，我们在这些选举中没有表明立场； 我们自始至终都刻意保持中立。 我们祝贺获胜者。 我们祝贺蔡英文，你知道，这是一次有效的民主选举。 现在，你知道，我们已经明确表示希望看到平稳过渡。

否则，从美国的角度来看，台湾表现出这种充满活力的民主性格是一件积极的事情。 我们的政策在此期间保持不变。 和以前一样，它将会向前发展——一个中国政策、《与台湾关系法》、六项保证，以及在座的人们都非常了解的所有问题。

拜登总统已经明确表示，我们仍然致力于一个中国政策。 我对王毅也说得很清楚。

我还明确表示，我们仍然对海峡周围侵略性军事活动的加剧感到担忧。 我们认为这无助于和平与稳定。 正如我认为世界其他国家所做的那样，我们普遍希望看到台湾海峡的和平与稳定。 我们致力于尽一切努力来支持这一目标。

先生。 哈德利：谢谢。 我想问一些关于中国经济的问题。 关于经济结构性问题的文章有很多，很多人猜测北京政府既没有能力也没有意愿解决这些根本性的结构性问题。 对中国经济前景的看法相当悲观。

我想知道这种叙述是否消极。 我想问你如何看待经济前景以及习近平和他的团队解决我们都知道的一些结构性问题的能力和意愿，这些问题涉及房地产行业、债务和所有其他领域。休息。

先生。 沙利文：你知道，在过去的几次里，我参加了加州大学圣地亚哥分校中国论坛——那是在我进入政府之前——我养成了一个习惯，就是去接触我所认识的关于中国和经济的最聪明的人，并扣扣他们和他们的观点。 说：“请告诉我有关中国经济的情况。” 我会听到一个人的笼统回答，我会想：“好吧，这就是答案。” 然后我会和其他人交谈，他们会有完全不同的答案。

对于中国经济走向何方，知识渊博、思想正确的人们的看法相当广泛。 因此，我很谦虚，无法真正描述该经济未来可能的轨迹，因为我认为如果你在两年前问人们这个问题，他们可能会得到与今天不同的答案。 坦率地说，如果你问人们一年前的美国经济与今天的情况，人们会有不同的答案。

因此，我们从根本上关注的是思考我们可以做些什么来投资美国自己的力量来源。 我在演讲中谈到了这一点。 我们有点拒绝我认为的一种普遍观点，即不知何故，你知道，这是一个一方面不可阻挡地崛起，另一方面不可阻挡地衰落的故事。 选择对北京和华盛顿都很重要。 我们正在努力做出正确的选择。 当然，这取决于北京如何选择站在自己一边。

没有真正回答你的问题怎么办？ （笑声。）

先生。 哈德利： 很好。 很好。 你知道 -

先生。 沙利文：我正在向托尼?布林肯学习如何成为一名外交官。 （笑声。）

先生。 哈德利：我将暂时脱离剧本，问一个关于您如何制定政策的问题，因为您明确表示我们的目标不是阻碍或破坏中国经济。 这不是我们正在做的事情的目标。 我们正在做一些事情来保护我们自己的国家安全利益。

但我们是否必须坦白地告诉中国，我们为保护自己的国家安全利益所做的一些事情实际上正在对中国经济产生不利影响，并将产生不利影响？ 它会对我们的经济增长等方面产生不利影响。

我们是否足够坦诚地向中国人说明我们正在做什么、为什么这样做以及这将对中国产生什么影响？

先生。 沙利文：我的意思是，我们真正尝试着手做的一件事 - 我在一年前的演讲中提到了这一点 - 是更加直接和透明地说明我们正在采取的措施的性质以及将要采取的措施 ，因为我们也在向他们发电报，“这就是我们进行对外投资或更新半导体出口管制的地方。 这就是我们这样做的原因。 这就是我们定制的方式。 这是我们制定的严格流程。 这就是理由。” 然后听到他们对此的回应。

我和王毅有机会在曼谷讨论了中国和美国如何看待经济与国家安全之间的界限。 显然，我们对这个问题的看法并没有完全一致。 但我认为重要的是要认识到，长期以来，中华人民共和国以国家安全为明确理由采取了对美国工人、美国企业和美国经济产生不利影响的措施。 因此，这不可能是一场单向的对话。

你知道，中国将在谈判桌上表达对美国所作所为的担忧。 美国有义务代表其公民坐到谈判桌前，表达我们对中国长期以来所作所为的担忧。 当我们在曼谷时，我当然已经做好了这样做的准备。

先生。 哈德利：对你有好处。

我将再给你一次发布新闻的机会。 （笑声。）

我们是否应该——特别是在这个技术问题上——期待拜登政府采取进一步措施来降低美国经济对中国过度依赖的风险？ 我们可能会在哪些领域看到进一步的行动？

先生。 沙利文：首先，为了回答你的问题，我可能不会制造新闻。

我只想花一点时间谈谈去风险的含义。 事实上，我已经直接向我的中国同行说了这一点。 它基本上具有三个要素。

首先，投资美国的工业和创新能力。 降低风险的一个重要方法是让我们自己拥有更多的能力，以便能够在技术创新的边缘运作。

 第二是使供应链多样化，这样我们就不会依赖于任何单点故障。 这还不是中国的全部。 这是我们从新冠疫情中吸取的教训。 但中华人民共和国是其中的一部分。

三是有一系列量身定制的措施，让美国技术科学不能用来破坏美国及其盟友的安全。 在这一类别中，我们一直透明地表示，我们已经采取了一系列步骤，并且我们将在前进过程中采取进一步的步骤，所有这些都根据我们将量身定制并以某种方式针对它们的基本原则 它们确实是针对我们的国家安全问题，而不是为了使我们的技术生态系统或经济脱钩而做出的更广泛的努力。 但额外措施的具体性质和时间表我将在稍后讨论。

我还要说的是：2022年10月，我们对先进半导体和半导体制造设备进行了第一轮出口管制。 2023 年 10 月，我们更新了它们。 我认为世界可以期待这将成为未来进程的一部分，因为随着技术的发展，我们的控制也必须发展。 这并不意味着我们控制所依据的标准会不断发展——这些标准保持不变——但它们必须随着技术的进步而应用于技术。 这将需要更新现有的控制措施，即使我们也在其他领域添加有针对性的、定制的控制措施。

先生。 哈德利：如果我是一个从火星上下来的人，我会说，听你讲话并观察两国关系，这两个国家正在努力保持关系的一定稳定性，并做出了一些战术转变，但从战略上讲，中国正在继续 他们已经推行了一段时间的一系列政策。 正如你刚才所建议的，拜登政府将继续执行已完成的政策。 似乎有很多向心力在拉动这种关系——这是在你进入美国国会之前。 你真的能把它拼凑在一起吗？ 有什么方法可以保留它（听不清）？

先生。 沙利文：听着，这是一个公平的问题。 显然，即使在拜登总统任期内，我们也经历了相当紧张的时期。 但他决心将这两件事同时记在心里。 正如我之前所说，是的，两国关系中存在结构性、竞争性的动态，我们应该对此保持清醒的认识，我们应该审视这一点——盯着脸上的方格。 另一方面，为了我们自己的国家利益，我们有义务确保竞争不会演变成冲突，我们将其管理到稳定的程度，并且我们也有义务在我们的利益符合的地方找到我们可以合作的领域。 对齐。

现在，我认为这个秘诀相对容易用文字来概括。 付诸行动就更难了。 这需要一定程度的激烈外交，就像我在演讲和关怀中真正尝试过的那样——你知道，基本上是不断的园艺。 即便如此，无论是可预见的还是不可预见的，风险和紧张局势都可能爆发。 我们不能——你不能否认这一点。 但这是——你知道，我们也不必对此抱有宿命论。

我们的工作是试图以清晰的方式理解这些风险和固有的紧张局势，并尽最大努力来管理它们，同时不损害我们的基本价值观，也不放弃对美国国家利益和利益的捍卫。 我们的盟友和伙伴的利益。

我试图以“让我们实际上只谈谈 2023 年以及我们这一年所做的事情”之类的方式发表这些言论的部分原因是，美中关系中有很多格言—— “管理竞争”，以及“投资、协调、竞争”。 归根结底，这实际上取决于我们在国内采取的一系列行动，我们对盟友和合作伙伴进行的一系列投资，然后与中国进行直接、顽强的外交，其基础是，是的， ，我们将竞争，但我们也将居住在同一个星球上，我们必须共同努力，以确保我们最终不会陷入冲突。

这就是这个的目的。 它并没有真正简化为保险杠贴纸。 但我认为这是一种常识性战略，可以确保两党的支持，如果你看看美国人对中国的态度，我认为这基本上就是美国人民的立场。 他们希望我们表现强硬，维护我们的利益，反击侵略或伤害美国人的行为，但他们也不寻求战争。 这就是我们正在努力的方向。

 先生。 哈德利：我最后一个简短的问题。 明天我们将在中国论坛上举行一次会议，讨论中国的内部政治局势，包括其政治体系的韧性和脆弱性。 对此你有什么想说的——

先生。 沙利文：不。（笑声）

先生。 哈德利：——就你如何——

先生。 沙利文：我建议你去北京发表评论。

先生。 哈德利：所以我们都必须收听明天的会议。

先生。 沙利文：没错。

先生。 哈德利：我猜杰克会听从这一点如果可以的话，让我们走向观众。 我想提醒大家，这是一次记录在案的会议，我想邀请观众参与这次对话。 所以请举手，我会叫你。

让我们从这位先生开始吧。

观众：非常感谢。 我叫马克?罗滕伯格。 我在人工智能和数字政策中心工作。

您在讲话中谈到了人工智能。 我首先想说的是，我认为中国参加英国人工智能峰会非常好。 这是最初没有预料到的。 但显然，正如您所说，保持有关人工智能在战争中的风险的讨论很重要。

但与此同时，也明显存在两种不同形式的政府。 人工智能可以支持开放和多元化的政府，或者人工智能可以支持更加封闭、受限的政府形式。

在我看来，目前正在展开一场关于人工智能治理的政策辩论，坦率地说，还有对美国立场的一些担忧。 因此，目前欧洲委员会正在谈判一项人工智能条约。 欧洲委员会的使命是促进基本权利、民主制度和法治。 我们的许多民主盟友正在寻求一项强有力的条约，以保障这个人工智能时代的基本权利。

人们对美国的立场表示担忧。 我的问题是：美国政府会支持一项强有力的人工智能条约来保障基本权利吗？

先生。 沙利文：因此，我们一直非常积极地参与欧洲委员会有关该条约的谈判，因为我们对人工智能治理的基本愿景植根于保护基本权利和赋予人们权力的理念，而不是提升这些权利。 而不是压制他们。

我们对人工智能治理的愿景确实与中国截然不同，这就是为什么我们与他们的对话将真正聚焦于我们作为重要国家和主要人工智能参与者的责任，以管理人工智能的风险。 向前。

我们还提出了自愿性标准，世界上一些最大的人工智能公司已经签署了这些标准。 我们发布了一项行政命令，反映了您问题核心的许多核心价值观和原则。

欧洲委员会对该条约的最终裁决并不在于美国是否支持或反对该条约，该条约在基本权利方面具有强有力的影响力。 它将涉及更具体的条款，可能会涉及我们的特定利益。

因此，我无法预测条约谈判的结果如何，但我可以告诉你们，无论结果如何，它都会——美国对这一更广泛愿景的基本承诺，我们已经阐明了这一愿景，现在已经开始将其融入其中。 国际机构，包括联合国大会努力制定一项关于人工智能的决议，这项工作将是积极的，美国将在其中发挥领导作用。

观众：谢谢。

先生。 哈德利：是的，女士。

观众：嗨。 非常感谢您今天和我们在一起。 我是瓦法?本?哈辛。 我在奥米迪亚网络。 我也是加州大学圣地亚哥分校政治学系的校友。 因此，感谢 CFR 将圣地亚哥带到我们这里，即使您无法到场。

我的问题实际上把我们带到了一个不同的地理环境。 在非洲，我们看到中国正在超越“一带一路”倡议和“数字丝绸之路”。 我们看到他们在试图影响政策方面进行了相对细致的干预，例如向各种非营利组织、独立媒体集团和媒体供应华为手机。

我很好奇你是否能稍微说明一下美国在非洲的定位，以及我们可能希望如何确保我们的国家安全并促进非洲的人权以应对此类干预措施。 谢谢。

先生。 沙利文：所以，首先，我姐姐实际上也是加州大学圣地亚哥分校的校友； 她去了加州大学圣地亚哥分校医学院。 所以我必须和她一起出去玩。 这是一个美丽的校园，一个上学的好地方。

库尔特和我在 2019 年的《外交事务》文章中写到的一件事是，我们不能像我认为的美国和其他国家那样，将世界其他国家视为代理战场，这对我们在这方面保持纪律非常重要。 冷战期间苏联经常这样做。

因此，看看非洲，我们的问题不应该是我们如何在这个国家获得相对于中国的相对优势，因为这成为一个扭曲和扭曲的因素，坦率地说，在某种程度上，也可能损害我们的整体地位。 因此，我们提出的问题是：我们如何提供更好的价值主张？

坦率地说，我想说，我们现在正在积极努力填补的空白领域之一是动员资本投资于非洲国家正在寻求的领域。他们的发展——基础设施、清洁能源、数字化。 这就是钱的问题。 这是关于公共部门的资金通过购买政治风险和货币风险来利用私营部门的美元。

我们与世界银行新任行长阿贾伊?班加（Ajay Banga）密切合作，拜登总统在帮助他就职方面发挥了积极作用。 我们正在努力扩大世界银行的能力来做到这一点。 为此，我们通过 PGI（全球基础设施和投资项目[原文如此]）与七国集团合作。

我们越来越希望与国会在两党合作的基础上合作，争取获得必要的资源来释放此类投资。 因为你无法凭空打败某物。 中国带来了大量资本，正如你所说，还有其他可以发挥作用的工具。

对于美国来说，我们的观点不应该是，你知道，在任何特定国家，你知道，我们获得一胜一负的方式是什么。 应该是：我们如何实际出现并提供一些能够满足该国合法发展需求的东西。

我想我会认为我们在这方面是不完整的。 我们在本届政府中已经开始相当积极地开展这项工作，而且我们还有很多工作要做。 这将需要国会与我们合作释放其中一些资源，进而释放私营部门更大份额的资源，以实现我们想要实现的价值主张。

先生。 哈德利：丹?罗森。

先生。 沙利文：丹可以谈谈中国经济。 （笑声。）

观众：但是人们已经听够我谈论这件事了，杰克。 这就是我想回到你身边的地方。

所以当你参加会议时，一位经济学家会想到一件事。 另一个，另一个。 但政治科学家和安全专家不也是这样吗，你将拥有一个完整的范围？

 为了进行一场系统性的竞争，你是否必须从某种角度来看待他们的经济体系的表现，才能弄清楚我们在这场竞争中的表现如何？

 尽管观众可能存在多样性，但我希望美国政府内部的你们能够对中国经济体系的表现做出净评估。

 先生。 沙利文：所以，首先，你刚刚完全推翻了我对史蒂夫问题的巧妙回避。 （笑声）所以，我很欣赏这一点。

 其次，事实上，丹——据丹所知，我们把一批深入研究中国经济的专家带到了白宫。 也许那是一年前的事了。 你知道，这个群体中存在着各种各样的意见，并且存在非常非常尖锐的分歧。

 首先，我想说有一点区别。 我发现对于基本的战略诊断并没有不同的意见。 关于我们应该在政治和安全方面采取什么措施，存在很多争论。 尽管有一些，但关于我们正在处理什么、我们正在关注什么的频谱较少。

 其次，是的，我们确实需要有一个操作假设。 但我想我想说的是，经营假设必须是谦虚的，因为它必须适应我们所看到的新经济数据的现实或我们所看到的各种趋势 一直在观察自己的表现。

 因此，我们是根据一组特定的假设进行操作的。 现在，我将第二次尝试回避阐述它们到底是什么，因为我只是不认为美国国家安全顾问以纸上谈兵的中国经济分析师的身份提出巨大的好处。 （笑声。）

 但我想说，如果我们的假设被证明是错误的，我们还需要一个可以应用的多向策略。 我还要说，准确地说，这是一个特别困难的时期，因为新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 疫情、所有因素如何协调到位。

 但总的来说，我在讲话中所说的话以及在回答史蒂夫问题时所说的话我只是想强调一下，那就是我们上任后并不接受我认为的关于美国相对轨迹的一种基础广泛的传统智慧。 和中华人民共和国。 总统不接受这一点。 我不接受这一点。 我们的团队没有。 我们继续反对这种认为不可阻挡的崛起、最终的衰退才是核心的观点——这是两国关系的核心特征。

我想我现在应该停止说话了，否则我会给自己惹上麻烦。 （笑声）所以我就这么做。

 先生。 哈德利：是的，女士。 请。

 观众：嘿，杰克。 Kim Dozier，CNN 分析师和 CFR 成员。

 我想问一下，关于中国继续支持美国的对手，特别是俄罗斯，包括北京帮助莫斯科避免一些技术制裁，以及提供的不是武器，而是基本设备，你的信息是什么？俄罗斯为乌克兰战争提供重型卡车等装备，以及中国通过增加石油采购来支持伊朗，而你最近指责伊朗支持上周末导致美军丧生的致命袭击。 谢谢。

 先生。 沙利文：正如我在演讲中提到的，乌克兰战争一直是我与中国同行对话的主线，可以追溯到王毅和杨洁篪之前的最初几个月，你知道，我们 发出了明确的信息，表明我们担心中国可能会提供针对乌克兰平民的致命援助。 我们还没有看到提供致命援助。

 但正如我在发言中所说，也正如你在问题中指出的那样，我们看到了中国企业的支持，帮助俄罗斯重建国防工业基础。 我们已经明确、直接地表达了我们的担忧。 我在讲话中指出，当我们看到这种情况发生时，我们准备采取措施应对此类活动，因为我们相信俄罗斯的国防工业基础基本上正在建立，以继续支持帝国的征服战争。 欧洲。 这是美国的根本国家安全利益。 在与我的同行的谈话中，我毫不掩饰这一点。

 总统最近签署了一项行政命令，赋予他额外的工具和权力来应对这一挑战。 它不针对中华人民共和国。 这对于支持俄罗斯国防工业基础的国家来说是普遍的，但它为我们提供了这方面的工具。

 就伊朗而言，讨论的重点领域之一是胡塞武装在红海的持续袭击以及对海上商业重要动脉的破坏，破坏了全球经济的供应链安全，坦率地说，破坏 对于中欧贸易而言，红海显然对中欧贸易至关重要。 并证明中国是一个负责任的参与者； 作为联合国安理会成员，美国有义务利用其在德黑兰的影响力，促使德黑兰境内的人利用其对胡塞武装的影响力来反击这种行为。

 你知道，我不会描述回应的特征，因为我会把这个问题留给王毅自己来做，但我只会说这是一次详细而实质性的对话，因为这是一个我们相信各国、 特别是联合国安理会常任理事国，拥有独特的责任，应该承担起这些责任。

 先生。 哈德利：我再回答一两个问题。 这里是这位绅士，然后是那边的这位女士。

 先生。

 观众：谢谢你，杰克。 阿特?柯林斯与 the GROUP。

 跟我们谈谈韩国和日本的三边关系吧。 据了解，你刚才提到，日本首相将于春季对日本进行国事访问。 日本显然正在增加——事实上，可能是增加一倍——其军事预算。 但在这方面，我们对韩国和日本的合作伙伴还有什么期望呢？ 除了我们已经做的事情之外，我们还准备对这种关键关系做什么？

 先生。 沙利文：嗯，你知道，首先，我认为重要的是要认识到三边关系的安全层面至关重要。 它一直是三个国家团结在一起的动力源泉。 它体现在更密切的情报协调、更密切的防务合作、演习、联合威慑上，特别是在朝鲜半岛问题上。 我们希望看到这种情况继续发展。

 但我还要指出，三边伙伴关系的范围远远不止于此。 首先，它扩展到区域之外。 如果你看看对乌克兰的支持，就会发现日本和韩国都大力支持欧洲民主国家。 日本首相特别明确地解释说，乌克兰发生的事情对印度-太平洋地区至关重要。 尹总统也强调了这一点。

 最后，这种关系延伸到经济胁迫、技术与国家安全、创新、经济投资和活力的交叉领域——这三个国家在所有领域都拥有巨大的互补能力来支持和提升彼此。

 当你把所有这些放在一起时，这就是具有共同价值观的三个国家之间的强大伙伴关系。 经济、技术、国家安全方面的巨大能力； 和全球影响力。

 所以，你知道，我们对迄今为止所做的工作感到非常自豪，但这在很大程度上是一项正在进行的工作，在我们前进的过程中必须不断加强。

 我最近刚刚在首尔参加了一次国家安全顾问三方会议，将其转化为我们如何在导弹防御预警等方面合作的细节，并思考我们可以合作的领域以太——例如，回答之前提出的问题：我们如何在拥有来自我们三个国家的三笔巨额官方发展援助预算的发展中国家共同提出价值主张？

 所以，你知道，三边伙伴关系不涉及任何国家。 这与中国无关。 这与朝鲜无关。 这是为了某种目标——对世界、对地区、更重要的是对世界的愿景。 我们认为它有助于在共同优先事项背后创造巨大的动力，我们希望继续发展这一势头。

 先生。 哈德利：最后一个问题。 我向那些我没有联系到的人表示歉意。

 女士，回来了。 就在这儿。 是的。 你能把麦克风递给她吗？ 太感谢了。

 观众：嗨。 玛吉?多尔蒂与参议院外交关系委员会。

 你简单地提到了人权，所以我想听听你对中国侵犯维吾尔族、藏族、基督教少数群体人权的策略。 我们将如何面对这一挑战？

 先生。 沙利文：首先，正如总统公开表示的那样，他在两次峰会的谈话中非常明确和直接地阐述了美国总统就这些问题发表讲话的基本责任和义务。 问题，因为这是我们的核心。 这并不是要试图将问题武器化；而是要试图将问题武器化。 这是为了践行我们的价值观。 这就是他在我们处理这个问题时试图向美国政府灌输的精神。

 因此，这意味着我们不仅要就这些问题大声疾呼，还要采取行动。 过去三年来，我们在你提到的每个领域都采取了一系列行动。 在很大程度上，我们是在两党合作的基础上与国会合作做到这一点的，包括我们政府通过的、我们现在正在实施的关于强迫劳动等问题的法律，《维吾尔族强迫劳动预防法》。

 因此，正如历届政府所做的那样，这仍将是美中关系的一个重要优先事项和特征。 从我们的角度来看，直接外交和对关系的强化管理与在与保护人权有关的问题上站出来发言并采取实质性行动并不矛盾。

 先生。 哈德利：所以我们已经到了最后的时刻了。 如果可以的话，让我告诉你我们接下来要做什么。

 我要感谢大家参加这次混合会议。 杰克，谢谢你和我们在一起。

 结尾

Remarks and Q&A by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Future of U.S.-China Relations

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/01/30/remarks-and-qa-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-future-of-u-s-china-relations/

JANUARY 30, 2024

Council on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

MR. SULLIVAN:  At least I had the bravery to give that speech at Brookings rather than at CFR.  So — (laughter) —

Mike, I want to say thank you for having me back at CFR.  And to Susan and Kurt and Charlene and Steve, thank you for having me back at the UCSD China Forum, which I’ve had the privilege of actually attending since its inauguration.  I would say San Diego in January is a little nicer than D.C. in January, but we’ll make do here.

My aim today is not to try to unveil a new China strategy, but something more straightforward: to share with you behind the curtain how we’ve tried to implement our strategy over the last three years and then what we might expect here in 2024.  And in the course of that, without directly answering the questions Mike has posed, perhaps provide a little grist for the mill that can help over the next couple of days as you grapple with these very difficult questions.

I want to start by taking a step back.

Before serving in the Biden administration, many of us who are now in government — including myself and Kurt and others — were revisiting the assumptions behind our longstanding China policy in writing and in conferences like this one.  And once in government, we immersed ourselves in the latest intelligence, expertise, and analysis.

We determined that the PRC was the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.  We saw that the PRC sought to “catch up and surpass” the United States in high technology; that it was pursuing the largest peacetime military buildup in history; and that it was more repressive at home and more assertive abroad, including in the South and East China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait.  We saw the PRC working to make the world more dependent on China while reducing its own dependence on the world.  And we saw it taking steps to adapt the international system to accommodate its own system and preferences.

We also saw something that really stood out, which is that the PRC believed the United States was in terminal decline — that our industrial base had been hollowed out, that our commitment to our allies and partners had been undercut, that the United States was struggling to manage a once-in-a-century pandemic, and that many in Beijing were openly proclaiming that “the East was rising and the West was falling.”

When we came into office, we inherited an approach from the previous administration that had updated the diagnosis of the scope and nature of the China challenge but had not adequately developed the strategy and tools to address it.  That approach was at times more confrontational than competitive, and too often undervalued the allies and partners critical to sustaining an effective China strategy.

But we did not want to return to an earlier approach with the PRC, one based on more optimistic assumptions about its trajectory and that sometimes prioritized avoiding friction over pursuing the American national interest.  So we developed our own approach, which Secretary Blinken laid out in a speech a couple of years ago — invest, align, compete — that sought to strengthen our competitive position and secure our interests and values while carefully managing this vital relationship.

And over the past three years, we’ve implemented that approach.  We’ve made far-reaching investments in the foundation of American strength at home with historic legislation on infrastructure, chips and science, and clean energy, all while addressing the PRC’s non-market practices and taking steps to ensure that the United States would lead in the sources of technological and economic growth.  

We believe our approach has generated results.  Large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean-energy production in the United States are up 20-fold since 2019.  Construction spending on new manufacturing projects has already doubled.  And looking out over the next decade, we’re estimating $3.5 trillion in new public and private investment, unlocked by the investments made in the historic legislation I just referenced.  

Abroad, we’ve tried to strengthen our ties with Indo-Pacific allies and partners in ways that would have been unlikely, even inconceivable, a few years ago.  We launched AUKUS.  We elevated the Quad.  We upgraded our relationship with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others.

We launched a historic trilateral with Japan and the Republic of Korea that culminated in a historic summit that President Biden hosted at Camp David.  

We held summits — multiple summits — with the leaders of the Pacific Islands as well as with ASEAN.

Our regional allies and partners, for their part, are betting on American economic vitality.  They’ve announced almost $200 billion of investments into the United States since the start of the administration.

We’ve also worked to connect our European and Indo-Pacific alliances.  And together with our G7 partners, we’ve aligned on collective steps to de-risk our economies and diversify away from strategic dependencies rather than decoupling.  And alongside our allies and partners, we’ve stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

We’ve also worked hard to ensure that advanced and sensitive technologies our companies are developing do not become a source of vulnerability.  We implemented carefully tailored export restrictions on key technologies; focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools — a topic, by the way, that was central to one of the earlier UCSD forums when I first really got immersed in this question of semiconductor manufacturing equipment; supercomputing capabilities; and the most advanced chips critical to military modernization.

We also took steps to regulate outbound investments of concern in technology and to strengthen CFIUS’s focus on critical technologies to make sure inbound investment actually addresses evolving national security challenges — the screening regime for inbound investment.

These steps are not about protectionism, and they’re not about holding anybody back.  They’re critical for our national security over the long run.

Now, the backdrop to these actions was the strongest post-pandemic recovery and among the lowest inflation of any leading economy in the world.  For years, economists were predicting that the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP either in this decade or the next.  Now those projections are moving further and further out.  And with the PRC facing its own set of challenges, some say that moment may never come.

And this brings me to a critical point: America, in this moment, is once more showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention.

 But this is not the whole story.  And that’s what’s really critical about the remarks I want to give today.

As we took these steps to improve our competitive position, we aimed to do so in a way that built stability into one of the world’s most consequential relationships — perhaps the world’s most consequential relationship.  And, in fact, we believe our investments at home and our work to deepen ties with allies and partners abroad actually created the conditions for more effective diplomacy with the PRC.

A sustainable China policy is about holding in one’s head multiple truths at the same time and working iteratively to reconcile them.  We are clear-eyed about the competitive structural dynamics in our relationship with the PRC.  But we’re also keenly aware that the United States and the PRC are economically interdependent and share interests in addressing transnational problems and reducing the risk of conflict.

We realize that efforts, implied or explicit, to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed.  We expect that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future.  That means that even as we compete, we have to find ways to live alongside one another.

Competition with the PRC does not have to lead to conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War.  The United States can take steps to advance its interests and values and those of its allies and partners on the one hand, while responsibly managing competition on the other.  Being able to do both of those things is at the heart of our approach.  And in fact, the United States has decades of experience talking to and even working with our competitors when our interests call for it.  

Over the last year, we’ve called on that experience.  And while “managing competition” can feel like an abstract slogan, the best way to understand how it translates into action is to “zoom in” on 2023.

The year began with the relationship at a historic low point.  A year ago this week, a Chinese spy balloon traveled across the United States.  We were, and remain, deeply concerned about the PRC providing Russia with lethal aid in its invasion of Ukraine.  And after historic and unprecedented — and not historic in a positive sense — PRC military exercises in August of 2022, it seemed a series of cross-Strait crises loomed over the horizon.

All of this set back the progress from the Bali summit between President Biden and President Xi.  High-level communication halted, to say nothing of military-to-military ties or cooperation on counternarcotics or climate — all of which the PRC had frozen.

We set out to stabilize the relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests.

Beginning in May of last year, we launched a period of intensive diplomacy.  It was an all-hands-on-deck effort across the Cabinet spanning the full range of our relationship with the PRC.  The goal was not to paper over our differences.  Our aim instead was to address misperceptions and miscommunication, to avoid major surprises, to reopen defunct channels, and to more clearly signal to each other about our respective positions and interests.  And we sought to increase not just the quantity but the quality of our communication.

 In May, I spent two days with Director Wang Yi in Vienna to help restore some normalcy to the relationship.  In Vienna, we reached consensus on a rough roadmap for high-level engagement to carry out the agenda that President Biden and President Xi had set forward in Bali — one both sides hoped at that time would ultimately culminate in a leader-level meeting in San Francisco at APEC later in the year.

 In the months that followed, we held a series of critical meetings.

 In June, Secretary Blinken traveled to Beijing and met with President Xi and senior foreign policy officials, working to stabilize after a period of tension.

In July, Secretary Yellen traveled to Beijing to build relationships with the PRC’s new economic leadership.  In that same month, Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry traveled to reopen climate channels that had stalled for months.

Then, in August, Secretary Raimondo visited the PRC to advance our commercial ties and underscore our commitment to protect critical technologies with national security implications without severing the economic relationship between the U.S. and China.

Critics said at the time that this travel was one-sided, but our strategy was to use those meetings to open up a two-way flow of exchanges, and that’s exactly what happened.

This intensive diplomacy was about managing tough issues rather than patching up the relationship.  We were direct about our differences, including PRC support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and cross-Strait issues.   

We did not pull back from national security-focused measures, like restrictions on outbound investment and updates to our export controls.  Instead, we used these meetings as opportunities to explain what these measures were, but almost as importantly, what they were not, which was an attempt to undermine the PRC’s prosperity and development.  That is not what those measures were, and we explained that clearly to our counterparts in these sessions.  

We also used these meetings to find space to coordinate on issues where our interests overlapped.

In September, Director Wang Yi and I met in Malta for another round of meetings.  We charted the course for a leader meeting in San Francisco and laid out what we hoped to accomplish on issues like counternarcotics and mil-mil channels.  

Over the following weeks, Majority Leader Schumer led a bipartisan delegation to the PRC, and the PRC sent a stream of officials to the United States, including the Vice President, the Vice Premier, and Director Wang Yi, who came for two days of meetings with Secretary Blinken and myself.

And all of this culminated, as you heard from Mike, in the meeting — the summit — between President Biden and President Xi in Woodside, California, which saw progress on three major issues.

First, President Biden and President Xi restarted counternarcotics cooperation.  Since then, we’ve seen Beijing take initial steps to stem the flow of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl, progress that we hope and need to see continue.  The first interagency counternarcotics working group between the U.S. and the PRC met today in Beijing, and our aim is to open up law enforcement cooperation on fighting this terrible drug.

Second, President Biden and President Xi announced the resumption of military-to-military communication that had been frozen for more than a year.  The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff has now spoken with his counterpart, and we’ve restored a number of critical operator-level mechanisms.  The question now is whether that will continue even in the face of future turbulence.  We, for our part, will continue to make the case that military-to-military communication is critical at all times but especially in times of tension.

And third, the Woodside summit saw our leaders announce a new dialogue aimed at managing the risks of artificial intelligence, which will start in the spring.

As Mike mentioned, this past weekend I met with Director Wang Yi in Bangkok to follow up on the Woodside summit and to advance efforts in each of these three areas.

Detailed, dogged diplomacy is necessary to manage the friction that is endemic to a strategic competition between two major powers.  Some risks to that effort may be unforeseeable, may be surprises.  Other risks are more recognizable, including friction in the South and East China Sea and economic and technology moves and countermoves.

The most significant risk would be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, especially given Beijing’s increased military activity in and around its air and waters.  Here, too, intensive diplomacy matters.

Just a few weeks ago, Taiwan held historic elections without any major cross-Strait incident, in part because all sides — Washington, Beijing, and Taipei — worked to reduce miscommunication and misperception about their respective intentions.  That is an outcome few may have foreseen in August of 2022, when most expected the cross-Strait situation to grow more tense, not less.  But it’s no guarantee of future trends, and the risk remains real.  So we have to keep working at this by intensifying both diplomacy and deterrence.

Over the next year, as we have for the last three, we’ll continue to take action on human rights abuses, forced labor, and nonproliferation.  We’ll be vigilant about the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and its efforts to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base, and we’ll take necessary measures to respond.

If PRC provocations continue in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait, we’ll work closely with allies and partners to push back and speak out about the risks to peace and stability in the world’s most important waterways.  We’ll continue to uphold freedom of navigation in the region by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.  And we’ll continue to pursue tailored national security measures designed to protect our national security.

And even as we do so, we’ll aim to continue the pace of intensive interaction with the PRC that has helped both sides manage areas of difference and unlock cooperation on areas where our interests align.

We’re not planning to recreate the now outdated structures and mechanisms from an earlier period in the bilateral relationship.  And we’re definitely not interested in dialogue just for dialogue’s sake.  But we do see value in launching and shepherding a select number of working-level consultations in discrete, carefully chosen areas to advance our interests and achieve results.  That’s the approach we use today on counternarcotics — an approach rooted in the here and now rather than in the nostalgia of the past.

In the period ahead, we hope we can work with the PRC to deepen crisis communication mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict.  We’re ready to coordinate on climate, health security, global macroeconomic stability, and new challenges like the risks posed by artificial intelligence.  We’ll also talk to Beijing about challenging regional and global issues, from the Red Sea to the Korean Peninsula.  And we’ll work to advance progress on a range of bilateral issues too, including people-to-people ties.

Let me conclude by noting that none of this will be easy, and there will be times of tension.  That’s inevitable in a competition like this that is simply not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state.  And as I noted, one thing is certain: There will be surprises along the way.

We’ll keep working to manage the competition as we have over the last year.  We’ll continue to invest in our strength at home and to deepen our global networks of alliances and partnerships abroad.

The approach I’m describing to you is not some big strategic shift.  It’s an effort we began building from the day we came into office.  It’s also not something new to American statecraft.  Far from it.  It’s an approach that is itself uniquely American and rooted in decades of history, diplomacy, and hard-won experience.  It’s also rooted in bipartisanship, because when the United States deals in a strategic competition from a position of strong bipartisan support, of all pulling together in service of the country, we always come out stronger for it.

So we intend to stick with this strategy.  We intend to do what we need to do to protect our interests and defend our allies, while at the same time effectively managing competition with China to the good not just of the United States, but to the good of global stability as well.  That is our commitment.  That’s what we’ve tried to do.

And today my goal was simply to walk you through how we’ve tried to execute that in practice so we can get beyond the kind of broad slogans and down to the actual day-to-day hard work that an incredible team of people across the entire U.S. government, both career and appointed, have been working.  And we’ve done so, I must say, looking around this room, with the support and advice of a huge number of people here from both parties, from the private sector and the public sector, and across a range of walks of life.  And that is the only way we’re going to continue to succeed in this effort as we go forward.

So thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak today, and I look forward to the conversation.  (Applause.)

MR. HADLEY:  Jake, thank you for being with us.  Thank you for your remarks.  I think we’re all much better informed about what you’ve been building in terms of China policy and the successes that you’ve had.

What we’re going to do is I’m going to ask three or four questions to Jake, up here.  And then we’re going to turn to the audience to take questions from you.  This is all on the record.  And we will try to end promptly at 7:45.  And I will proceed with the rest of the activities of the evening.

Let me begin by asking you if — what, if anything, you would feel comfortable telling us about your recent meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Thailand.  Any great breakthroughs to report here tonight?  (Laughter.)  Any news you want to make before the assembled multitude?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, first, we had a very nice meal.  So that was good.  (Laughter.)

You know, this is my third extended round of conversations with Wang Yi — the first in Vienna, the second in Malta, and then this one in Bangkok.  And with each successive round, I think we have increasingly gotten to the point of setting aside the talking points and really having strategic conversations.

In terms of next steps, the main things coming out of the meeting were actually to, you know, kind of fix the launch of this AI dialogue, where the U.S. and China will work together to manage risk.  And that will get going this spring.  So we talked through what the elements of that would look like.

Second, we had the opportunity to go deep on cross-Strait issues and to share our respective positions.  And I’ll be cautious.  As you know very well, this is littered with landmines to speak about publicly.  And also, I want to respect the discretion of the channel.  But I think it was a very useful, direct, and candid set of conversations on that topic.

And then, we obviously also had the opportunity to talk about current events — current events in the Red Sea, current events on the Korean Peninsula, concerns that we have about instability in both places.  And I would say the quality and character of those conversations and a rather direct and, in some ways, intensive conversation about the war in Ukraine, I think helped both of us leave feeling that we didn’t agree or see eye-to-eye on everything but that there was a lot of work to carry forward.

Last point I would make: We agreed that President Biden and President Xi should speak and should speak by telephone relatively soon.  And I think the acknowledgment coming out of Woodside that there really is no substitute for leader-to-leader conversation — I mean, it became so apparent over the course of that meeting at Woodside how central that ingredient has to be to an effective stewardship of U.S.-China policy.  And so, both of us agreed that we would report back to our leaders and we would get them on the phone sooner rather than later.

MR. HADLEY:  Great.  Let me ask you on the Taiwan question.  They recently, of course, had elections in Taiwan.  A lot of commentary by some of the people in this room about the significance of those elections.  How do you see them?  And what impact do you think the results might have on our ability to manage the cross-Strait relationship?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, you know, we were explicit and direct, publicly and privately, with all stakeholders that we were not taking a position in those elections; we remained studiously neutral throughout.  We congratulated the winner.  We congratulated the — Tsai Ing-wen on, you know, an effective democratic election.  And now, you know, we’ve made clear we would like to see a smooth transition.

And otherwise, from the United States’ perspective, Taiwan exhibiting this vibrant, democratic character is a positive thing.  And our policy remains constant through it.  As it was before, it will be going forward — the One China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and all of the issues that people in this room know so well.

And President Biden has been clear that, you know, we remain committed to the One China policy.  And I was clear on that with Wang Yi as well.

I was also clear that we continue to have concerns about elevated levels of aggressive military activity around the Strait.  We don’t regard that as conducive to peace and stability.  And we generally want to see, as I think the rest of the world does, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.  And we are committed to doing everything we can to support that.

MR. HADLEY:  Thank you.  I want to ask a little bit about the Chinese economy.  There’s a lot that has been written about the structural problems of the economy, a lot of speculation that the administration in Beijing has neither the ability nor the willingness to address those underlying structural problems.  A fairly gloomy view about the prospects for the Chinese economy.

And I wonder whether that negative — whether that narrative is too negative.  And I’d ask you how you see the prospects of the economy and the ability and willingness of Xi and his team to address some of the structural problems that we all know about in terms of the real estate sector, indebtedness, and all the rest.

MR. SULLIVAN:  You know, in the last couple of times I went to the UCSD China Forum — it was before I came into government — I made a habit of going up to the smartest people I know on China and on economics, and buttonholing them and saying, “Tell me about the economy in China.”  And I would hear a, kind of, general answer from one and I would think, “Okay, that’s the answer.”  And then I would talk to someone else, and they would have quite a different answer.

And the spectrum of opinion on whither China’s economy among incredibly informed, like, right-thinking people is quite broad.  And so, I’m humble enough to not really be able to characterize the likely future trajectory of that economy because I think if you would have asked people that question two years ago, they might have a different answer than they have today.  Frankly, if you asked people about the U.S. economy one year ago versus where they are today, people would have a different answer.

So what we’re focused on fundamentally is thinking about what we can do to invest in the sources of our own strength here in the United States.  And I talked about that some in my speech.  And we kind of reject what I believe was a kind of common view that somehow, you know, it was a story of inexorable rise on the one side and inexorable decline on the other side.  Choices matter in both Beijing and Washington.  We’re trying to make the right choices.  And of course, it’s up to Beijing how they choose to make choices on their side.

How’s that for not really answering your question?  (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY:  It’s good.  It’s good.  You know —

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’m learning from Tony Blinken how to be a diplomat.  (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY:  I’m going to go off script for a minute and ask one question about how you frame the policy, because you made clear that our goal is not to hold back or undermine the Chinese economy.  That’s not the objective of what we’re doing.  We’re doing things to protect our own national security interests.

But don’t we have to be candid with China that some of the things we are doing to protect our own national security interests are actually having an adverse and will have an adverse effect on the Chinese economy?  It’ll have an adverse effect on our economy in terms of economic growth and the like.

Have we been candid enough with the Chinese about what it is we’re doing, why we’re doing it, and what impact it’s going to have on China?

MR. SULLIVAN:  I mean, one thing that we really tried to embark on — and I alluded to this in my speech a year ago — was to be much more direct and transparent about what the nature of the measures we were undertaking both were and would be, because we were telegraphing to them, as well, “This is where we are going on outbound investment or on updates to semiconductor export controls.  This is why we’re doing it.  This is how we’ve tailored it.  This is the rigorous process we put in place.  And this is the rationale.”  And then heard their response to that.

And Wang Yi and I had an opportunity in Bangkok to talk about how each of us, China and the United States, see the boundary between economics and national security.  And obviously, we don’t have completely converging perspectives on that question.  But I think it’s really important to recognize that, for a very long time, the PRC has taken measures on explicit grounds of national security that have had an adverse impact on American workers, American businesses, the American economy.  And so, this cannot be a one-way street of a conversation.

You know, China will come to the table with its concerns about what the United States is doing.  And the United States has an obligation on behalf of its citizens to come to the table with our concerns about what China has been doing for quite a long time.  And I certainly came to the table prepared to do that when we were in Bangkok.

MR. HADLEY:  Good for you.

I’m going to give you one more chance to make some news.  (Laughter.)

Should we — on this issue of technology in particular, should we expect further steps by the Biden administration to de-risk the U.S. economy from its overdependence on China?  And in what areas are we likely to see further action?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So first, to answer your question, I probably won’t make news.

I just want to take a minute on what we mean by de-risking.  And, in fact, I’ve said this directly to my Chinese counterparts.  It basically has three elements.

First, investing in America’s industrial and innovation capacity.  A big way to de-risk is to have more capacity ourselves to be able to, you know, operate at the technological innovation edge.

The second is to diversify supply chains so that we’re not dependent on any single point of failure.  And that’s not all about China.  That’s a lesson we learned from COVID.  But the PRC is a part of that.

And the third is to have a series of tailored measures so that American technology cannot be used to undermine the security of the United States and our allies.  And in this category, we have been transparent that we’ve taken a series of steps already, and we will take further steps as we go forward, all according to the basic principle that we are going to tailor them and target them in a way that they really are aimed at our national security concerns and not at a broader effort to decouple our technological ecosystems or our economies.  But I will leave for a later day what exactly the nature and timetable of additional measures will be.

One more thing I will say is: In October of 2022, we did a first round of export controls on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  In October of 2023, we updated them.  I think the world can expect that will be part of the process going forward, because as the technology evolves, our controls have to evolve.  It doesn’t mean the standards underlying our controls evolve — those remain constant — but they have to be applied to technology as it advances.  And that will require updates to existing controls, even as we add, you know, targeted, tailored controls in other areas as well.

MR. HADLEY:  If I were a man from Mars coming down, I would say, listening to you and observing the relationship, that these two countries are trying to maintain some stability in the relationship and have made some tactical shifts, but strategically, China is continuing with a series of policies they’ve been pursuing for some time.  And the Biden administration is going to continue, as you just suggested, with the policies done.  There seem to be a lot of centripetal forces pulling at this relationship — and that’s before you get to the United States Congress.  Can you really keep it kludged together?  What’s the way to keep it (inaudible)?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Look, it’s a fair question.  And obviously, we’ve gone through periods of considerable tension, even during President Biden’s tenure.  But he is determined to hold these two things in his head at the same time.  As I said before, that, yes, there are structural, competitive dynamics in the relationship, and we should be clear-eyed about that, and we should look at that — stare at that square in the face.  And on the other hand, we have an obligation for our own national interest to ensure that that competition does not veer into conflict, that we manage it to a point of stability, and that we also find areas where we can work together where our interests align.

Now, that recipe is, I think, relatively easily distilled in words.  It is harder to put into action.  And it requires a level of intense diplomacy of the kind I really tried to walk through in my speech and care — you know, basically constant gardening.  And even then, whether foreseen or unforeseen, risks and tensions could boil over.  We cannot — you cannot deny that.  But it is — you know, we don’t have to be fatalistic about it, either.

Our job is to try to understand, in a clear-eyed way, what those risks and inherent tensions are, and do our very best to manage them without compromising on our fundamental values and without walking away from the defense of the American national interest and the interest of our allies and partners.

And part of the reason that I tried to give these remarks in more of a way of, like, “let’s actually just talk about 2023 and what we did through the year” is it’s there’s a lot of aphorisms in the U.S.-China relationship — “manage competition,” and, you know, “invest, align, compete.”  At the end of the day, it really comes down to a set of actions that we take here domestically, a set of investments we make in our allies and partners, and then just direct, dogged diplomacy with China built on the proposition that, yes, we’re going to compete but we also are going to inhabit the same planet, and we have to work together to ensure that we don’t end up tipping over into conflict.

That’s what this is about.  It doesn’t really reduce to a bumper sticker.  But I think it’s a kind of common-sense strategy that can secure bipartisan support and that people — if you kind of look at American attitudes on the PRC, I think that’s basically where the American people are.  They want us to be tough and stand up for our interests and push back against aggression or actions that harm Americans, but they also are not looking for war.  And so that’s what we’re trying to work towards.

MR. HADLEY:  Last quick question from me.  We have a session tomorrow on the China forum about the internal political situation in China, both its resilience and its fragility in its political system.  Anything you want to say about that —

MR. SULLIVAN:  No.  (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY:  — in terms of how you —

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’ll refer you to Beijing to comment on it.

MR. HADLEY:  So we’ll all have to tune into the session tomorrow.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Exactly.

MR. HADLEY:  I guess Jake is deferring to that.

Let’s go to the audience if we can.  I want to remind everybody this is an on-the-record session, and I’d like to invite folks from the audience to engage in this conversation.  So please raise your hand and I will call on you.

Let’s start with this gentleman here.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you very much.  My name is Marc Rotenberg.  I’m with the Center for AI and Digital Policy.

And you talked about artificial intelligence in your remarks.  I wanted to begin by saying I think it was very good that China participated in the UK AI Summit.  That was not originally anticipated.  But clearly, as you’ve said, it’s important to maintain discussion about the risk of AI in warfare.

But at the same time, there are also clearly two different forms of government.  And AI can support an open and pluralist government or AI can support a more closed, constrained form of government.

And it seems to me that there is a policy debate playing out right now regarding the governance of AI and, frankly, some concerns about the U.S. position.  So, presently, at the Council of Europe, a treaty on AI is being negotiated.  The mandate of the Council of Europe is to promote fundamental rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.  And many of our democratic allies are looking for a robust treaty that safeguards fundamental rights in this era of AI.

Concerns have been expressed about the U.S. position.  And my question is: Will the U.S. government support a robust treaty on AI that safeguards fundamental rights?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, we have been very actively engaged in the negotiations over the treaty at the Council of Europe because our basic vision for the governance of AI is rooted in the idea of the protection of fundamental rights and the empowerment of people lifting them up rather than holding them down.

And we do have a very different vision of AI governance than the PRC does, which is why our dialogue with them will really vector in on our, kind of, responsibility as significant countries and major AI players to manage the risks of AI as we go forward.

And we’ve put forward voluntary standards that we’ve gotten some of the biggest AI players in the world to sign up to.  We’ve issued an executive order that reflects many of the core values and principles that are at the heart of your question.

Where things ultimately land on the treaty in the Council of Europe is not going to be whether the U.S. is for or against the treaty that is strong on fundamental rights.  It’ll be on more specific provisions that may cut across particular interests we have.

So I can’t predict how that treaty negotiation will turn out, but I can tell you that however it turns out, it will — the United States’ basic commitment to this broader vision, which we have articulated ourselves and have now begun infusing in international institutions including an effort at the U.N. General Assembly to have a resolution on AI, that work will be active and the United States will play a leadership role in it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you.

MR. HADLEY:  Yes, ma’am.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hi.  Thank you so much for being with us today.  I’m Wafa Ben-Hassine.  I’m at the Omidyar Network.  I’m also a UC-San Diego alum, political science.  So thank you to the CFR for bringing San Diego to us, even if you couldn’t be there.

My question actually takes us to a different geography.  In Africa, we see China moving beyond the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road.  We see them have relatively nuanced interventions in how they attempt to influence policy, such as, by way of example, supplying Huawei phones to all sorts of nonprofits and independent media groups and outlets.

I’m curious if you could illuminate a little bit about the U.S.’s positioning in Africa and how we would potentially like to secure our national security and also promote human rights in Africa in response to these types of interventions.  Thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, my sister is actually a UCSD alum as well; she went to UCSD medical school.  So I got to hang out there with her.  It’s a beautiful campus, a wonderful place to go to school.

One thing that Kurt and I wrote in our Foreign Affairs piece in 2019 that I have felt, like, really important to keep us disciplined in this is that we cannot treat the rest of the world as proxy battlegrounds the way that I think the U.S. and the Soviet Union too often did during the Cold War.

So, looking at Africa, our question should not be how do we gain relative advantage over China in this country, because that becomes a warping and distorting factor that, frankly, in a way, can also undermine our overall position.  So the question we pose instead is: How do we offer a better value proposition?

And I would say one of the areas that, frankly, is a gap that we are trying to fill now quite actively is mobilization of capital for investment in the things that African countries are looking for for their development — in infrastructure, in clean energy, in digital.  And that’s about money.  And it’s about public-sector money leveraging private-sector dollars by buying down political risk, currency risk.

And we have worked very closely with the new head of the World Bank, who President Biden, you know, played an active role in helping get into the job, Ajay Banga.  We’re trying to expand the World Bank’s capacity to do this.  We’ve worked with the G7 through PGI, the Project [sic] on Global Infrastructure and Investment, to do this.

And we’re increasingly looking to work on a bipartisan basis with the Congress to try to have the resources necessary to unlock these kinds of investments.  Because you can’t beat something with nothing.  China is coming with a substantial amount of capital and also, as you said, other tools to be able to bring to bear.

And for the United States, our view should not be, you know, in any given country, you know, what’s just the way we get a one-up.  It should be: how do we actually show up and offer something that will respond to the legitimate development needs of that country.

And I think I would grade us as incomplete on this.  It’s work that we have begun to do quite actively in this administration, and we have a lot more work to do.  That’s going to require Congress working with us to unlock some of these resources that in turn can unlock a much larger share of resources from the private sector to deliver the value proposition we want to deliver.

MR. HADLEY:  Dan Rosen.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Dan can talk about the Chinese economy.  (Laughter.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  But people have heard enough of me talking about it, Jake.  So that’s where I want to circle back to you.

So you come to the conference, and one economist thinks one thing.  Another, another.  But isn’t that true of political scientists and security experts out here too, that you’re going to have a whole spectrum?

And to fight a — to wage a systemic competition, don’t you have to come down to a sort of point of view about how their economic system is doing in order to figure out how well we’re performing in that competition?

And while there’s probably diversity here in the audience, I hope within USG you guys managed to come to a net assessment about how that Chinese economic system is performing.

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, you’ve just completely exploded my artful dodge of Steve’s question.  (Laughter.)  So, I appreciate that.

Second, in fact, Dan — as Dan knows, we brought in a group of experts, who have immersed themselves in the Chinese economy, to the White House.  Maybe it was a year ago or so.  And there was a diversity of opinions among that group, you know, with quite — quite sharp disagreements.

First, I would say there is a bit of a difference.  I don’t find the diversity of opinion on just basic underlying strategic diagnosis.  There’s a lot of debate about what we should do about it on the political and security side.  Less spectrum on kind of what are we dealing with, what are we looking at, though there are some.

Secondly, yes, we do need to have an operating assumption.  But I think the point I’d like to make is that operating assumption has to be humble, because — and it has to be adaptable to the reality of what we see as new economic data comes out or as various trends that we’ve all been watching manifest themselves.

So we are operating according to a certain set of assumptions.  I will now for the second time try and dodge laying out exactly what they are because I just don’t see a huge amount of upside in the U.S. National Security Advisor kind of holding forth as an armchair analyst on China’s economy.  (Laughter.)

But I would say that we also need a multidirectional strategy that can apply if our assumptions turn out to be wrong.  And I would also say that this has been a uniquely difficult time, to be quite precise on this, because of COVID-19, the pandemic, how all the pieces fit into place.

But broadly speaking, what I said in my remarks and what I said in answer to Steve’s question I would just reinforce, which is we came into office not accepting what I think was a kind of broad-based conventional wisdom about relative trajectories of the U.S. and the PRC.  The President didn’t accept that.  I didn’t accept that.  Our team did not.  And we continue to push back against this idea about inexorable rise, terminal decline as being central — a central characteristic of the relationship. 

And I guess I should stop talking now because otherwise I’ll get myself into trouble.  (Laughter.)  So that’s what I’ll do. 

MR. HADLEY:  Yes, ma’am.  Please. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hey, Jake.  Kim Dozier, CNN analyst and CFR member. 

I wanted to ask what your message was regarding China’s continuing support for U.S. adversaries, specifically Russia, including Beijing helping Moscow avoid some of the technology sanctions and providing, while not weapons, but basic equipment like heavy-duty trucks for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and China’s support for Iran with rising petroleum purchases, whereas you’ve recently blamed Iran for supporting the deadly attacks that cost the lives of U.S. troops this past weekend.Thanks. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, as I referred to in my speech, the war in Ukraine has been a through-line of my conversations with my Chinese counterparts going back to before Wang Yi, with Yang Jiechi, in the early months, you know, where we sent a clear message about our concern that China might provide lethal aid for use against civilians in Ukraine.  We have not seen the provision of lethal aid. 

But as I said in my remarks, and as you noted in your question, we have seen support from Chinese companies to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base.  And we have been clear and direct about our concerns.  And I noted in my remarks that as we watch this happen, we’re prepared to take steps to respond to that kind of activity, because we believe that Russia’s defense industrial base is basically building up to continue to support an imperial war of conquest in Europe.  And that’s a fundamental national security interest of the United States.  And I made no bones about that in my conversations with my counterpart. 

And the President has recently signed an executive order that gives him additional tools and authorities to deal with this challenge.  It’s not directed at the PRC.  It is general to countries that are supporting Russia’s defense industrial base, but it gives us tools in this regard. 

With respect to Iran, one of the areas of substantial focus in the discussion was about the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the disruption of a vital artery of maritime commerce, undermining of supply chain security in the global economy, and frankly, disruption to China-Europe trade, which the Red Sea is obviously, you know, critical to.  And made the case that, you know, China is a responsible player; as a U.N. Security Council member, has an obligation to use the influence it has in Tehran to get those in Tehran to use the influence they have with the Houthis to push back against this kind of behavior. 

And I won’t, you know, characterize the response because I’ll leave that to Wang Yi to do for himself, but I will just say that was a detailed and substantive conversation, because it is a matter where we believe that countries, particularly permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have unique responsibilities and should step up to those responsibilities. 

MR. HADLEY:  I’ll take one or two more questions.  This gentleman here and then this woman back there. 

Sir. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you, Jake.  Art Collins with theGROUP. 

Talk to us a little bit about the trilateral relationship with South Korea and Japan.  As we know, you mentioned it earlier, the Prime Minister of Japan will be here in the spring for a state visit.  Japan is obviously increasing — in fact, maybe doubling — its military budget.  But what else do we expect from our partners in that regard, in both South Korea and Japan?  And what are we prepared to do, beyond what we’ve already done, with that critical relationship? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, you know, first, I think it’s important to recognize that the security dimension of that trilateral relationship is critical.  It has been a source of propulsion for pulling the three countries together.  And it manifests in closer intelligence coordination, closer defense cooperation, exercises, joint deterrence, particularly when it comes to the Korean Peninsula.  And we’d like to see that continue to evolve. 

But I would also point out that the trilateral partnership expands well beyond that.  First, it expands beyond the region.  If you look at support for Ukraine, Japan and Korea have both stepped up in significant ways to stand with a fellow democracy in Europe.  And the Japanese prime minister has been particularly articulate in explaining that what happens in Ukraine matters in the Indo-Pacific.  And President Yoon has reinforced that. 

And then finally, the relationship extends to economic coercion, the intersection of technology and national security, innovation, economic investment and vitality — all areas where the three countries have a huge amount of complementary capacity to support and lift one another up. 

When you put all that together, that is a formidable partnership of three countries with shared values; huge capacities across economics, technology, national security; and global reach. 

And so, you know, we’re very proud of the work that we’ve done so far, but it is very much a work in progress and has to be built on from strength to strength as we go forward. 

I was just recently in Seoul for a trilateral meeting of national security advisors to convert this into the details of how we work together on things like early warning for missile defense and also to think about areas where we can work together — for example, to answer the question that was posed earlier: How do we collectively have a value proposition in the developing world with three large ODA budgets from our three countries? 

So, you know, that is not — that trilateral partnership is not about any country.  It’s not about China.  It’s not about North Korea.  It’s about being for something — a vision for the world, for the region, but for the world writ large.  And we feel that it has helped create a huge amount of momentum behind shared priorities, and we want to continue to develop that. 

MR. HADLEY:  Last question.  And I apologize to those who I did not get to. 

Ma’am, back here.  Right here.  Yes.  Can you pass her the mic?  Thank you so much. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hi.  Maggie Dougherty with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

You briefly mentioned human rights, so I would like to hear your strategy towards Chinese abuse of human rights — Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christian minorities.  How are we going to face that challenge? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, the President, as he has said publicly, has been very clear and direct in his conversations, in the two summits that he’s had, about the kind of fundamental responsibility and obligation of an American president to speak out on these issues, because it’s core to who we are.  That’s not about trying to weaponize the issue; it’s about living out our values.  And that’s the ethos that he has tried to inculcate across the U.S. government as we deal with this issue. 

And so that means not just that we speak out on these issues but that we take actions.  And we have taken a series of actions over the course of the past three years in each of the areas you mentioned.  And to a considerable extent, we have done that in partnership with the Congress on a bipartisan basis, including laws that have been passed under our administration that we are now implementing, on issues like forced labor, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. 

So this is something that will remain a critical priority and feature of the U.S.-China relationship, as it has through multiple administrations.  And from our perspective, having direct diplomacy and intensive management of the relationship is not inconsistent with standing up for speaking out on and taking material action on issues related to the protection of human rights. 

MR. HADLEY:  So we’re here at the end of our time.  Let me tell you where we’re going to proceed from here, if I can. 

I want to thank you all for joining this hybrid meeting.  Jake, thank you for being with us.

 END