《独裁者手册：为什么坏行为几乎总是好的政治手段》

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Dictator%27s_Handbook

布鲁斯·布埃诺·德·梅斯基塔和阿拉斯泰尔·史密斯合著的这本2011年出版的非虚构作品，由PublicAffairs出版社发行。书中探讨了政治家如何获得并维持政治权力。

布埃诺·德·梅斯基塔是胡佛研究所的研究员。他的合著者也是一位学者，两人都是政治学家。

《华尔街日报》的迈克尔·C·莫伊尼汉在书评中指出，本书的写作风格与《魔鬼经济学》相似。莫伊尼汉补充说，本书的结论源于经济学、历史学和政治学领域，因此他称两位作者为“博学家”。

梅斯基塔和史密斯曾与其他作者合著学术著作《政治生存的逻辑》，探讨了“选民”理论。 1095

Netflix 剧集《如何成为暴君》部分取材于本书。

内容

布埃诺·德·梅斯基塔和史密斯认为，无论身处威权独裁政权还是民主政体，政治家都必须取悦核心权力掮客圈子才能保住权力，并且为了维持权力，政治家必须从事利己主义行为。

他们认为，政治家的动机是“获得权力、保住权力，并在力所能及的范围内控制金钱”。民主政体和威权政体政治家的主要区别在于，民主政体政治家必须取悦众多权力掮客和/或广大公众，而威权政体政治家则只需取悦相对较小的圈子。这分别被称为大型联合政府和小型联合政府。威权社会和民主社会所建立的基础设施体现了这些差异。

此外，由于权力掮客圈子较小，专制统治者往往执政时间更长。[3] 作者还指出，政客们通常会在对自己有利或迫不得已的情况下才会采取有益的行动。该书还认为，对第三世界国家的援助有利于专制政府，尽管援助制度可以改革，以帮助真正需要援助的国家。

本书各章节使用的术语有时有所不同。《金融时报》的塞缪尔·布里坦指出，这有时会令人困惑。

评论

《麦克林》杂志的马丁·帕特里克写道，作者们“颠覆了一个老生常谈的陈词滥调，提出了一个令人震惊的有力论点。权力本身并不会使人腐败，而是权力不可避免地会吸引腐败之人。”

《卫报》的埃德·豪克指出，该书假定所有政客的行为都是理性的，其态度如此愤世嫉俗，“以至于我不止一次感到不适”。他补充说，“了解专制政府和体制的运作方式是有益的”。

莫伊尼汉写道，这本书“包含许多符合常识的观点”。[3] 他还补充说，由于本书涵盖范围广泛，因此存在一些小的事实错误。

布里坦写道，这本书“在分析发展中国家的独裁政权或像俄罗斯或伊朗这样高度不完善的民主政体时，尤其具有启发意义”。

蒙特利尔大学的西奥多·麦克劳克林总结说，这是一本“实用的入门读物”，也是一本“令人振奋的书，它确实将各种政治现象联系起来”。麦克劳克林批评了他认为本书未能定义“获胜联盟”和“选民群体”以及分析中的其他一些问题。

出版历史

《独裁者手册》（第一版）。公共事务出版社。 2011年9月1日。ISBN 978-1-61039-044-6。

《独裁者手册》（第二版）。PublicAffairs出版社。2022年4月26日。ISBN 9781541701366。

The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Dictator%27s_Handbook 

2011 non-fiction book by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, published by the company PublicAffairs. It discusses how politicians gain and retain political power.

Bueno de Mesquita is a fellow at the Hoover Institution.[1] His co-writer is also an academic,[2] and both are political scientists.[3]

Michael C. Moynihan reviewing the book for The Wall Street Journal stated that the writing style is similar to that of Freakonomics.[3] Moynihan added that the conclusions the book makes originate from the fields of economics, history, and political science, leading him to call the authors "polymathic".[3]

Mesquita and Smith, with other authors, previously wrote about the "selectorate" theory in the academic book The Logic of Political Survival.[4]: 1095 

The Netflix series How to Become a Tyrant is partly based on this book.[5]

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue that politicians, regardless of whether they are in authoritarian dictatorships or in democracies, must stay in power by pleasing a core inner circle of power brokers, and that politicians must engage in self-interested behavior in order to stay in power.[2] They argued that the motives of politicians are "To come to power, to stay in power and, to the extent that they can, to keep control over money."[3] The main difference between the scenarios of democratic and authoritarian politicians is that democratic politicians have to please a large number of power brokers and/or the public at large while authoritarian ones please relatively small circles. These are referred to as large coalition governments and small coalition governments. These differences are illustrated in the infrastructure developed in authoritarian and democratic societies. In addition, authoritarian rulers, due to their smaller circles of power brokers, tend to have longer periods of power.[3] The authors also stated that politicians usually do beneficial acts when these acts benefit them or when they must do the acts.[2] The book also argues that aid to third-world countries benefits authoritarian governments, though it can be reformed to help those who need it.[6]

Occasionally terminologies differ in sections of the book. Samuel Brittan of the Financial Times argued that this is sometimes confusing.[6]

Martin Patriquin of Maclean's wrote that the authors "make a frightfully good argument by turning an old cliché on its ear. Power doesn’t corrupt. Rather, power inevitably attracts the corrupted."[2]

Ed Howker of The Guardian stated that the book assumes all politicians act rationally, and that its attitude was so cynical "that it made me flinch on more than one occasion."[1] He added that "it's good to read the evidence" of how authoritarian governments and systems operate.[1]

Moynihan wrote that the book "contains many points that are common-sensical".[3] Moynihan added that there are some minor errors in fact in the book due to its large scope.[3]

Brittan wrote that it is "most illuminating in the cases of dictatorships in the developing world or highly imperfect democracies such as Russia or Iran."[6]

Theodore McLauchlin of the University of Montreal concluded that it is a "serviceable introduction" and "bracing book that does indeed connect the dots across a wide array of political phenomena."[4]: 1099  McLauchlin criticized what he perceived were the book's failure to define what a "winning coalition" and "selectorate" are and other issues in the analysis.[4]: 1098 

Publication history

The Dictator's Handbook (1st ed.). PublicAffairs. September 1, 2011. ISBN 978-1-61039-044-6.

The Dictator's Handbook (2nd ed.). PublicAffairs. April 26, 2022. ISBN 9781541701366.